Guidelines for cryptography
71 controls in 7 sections in this part of the Information Security Manual (ISM). Each control links to plain-English guidance, audit tips and cross-framework mappings.
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Cryptographic algorithms
31 controls- ISM-0471Restrict cryptographic products to AACAs or high assurance algorithmsCryptographic equipment, applications and libraries must use no algorithm other than an AACA (ASD-Approved Cryptographic Algorithm) or a high assurance cryptographic algorithm.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0472Using proper modulus size for Diffie-Hellman keysOn non-classified, OFFICIAL: Sensitive and PROTECTED systems, DH used to agree on encryption session keys must have a modulus of at least 2048 bits, with 3072 preferred.NCOSP
- ISM-0474Using secure elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman encryptionOn non-classified, OFFICIAL: Sensitive and PROTECTED systems, ECDH used to agree on encryption session keys needs a base point order and key size of at least 224 bits, preferably NIST P-384.NCOSP
- ISM-0475Use an ECDSA base point order and key size of at least 224 bitsOn non-classified, OFFICIAL: Sensitive and PROTECTED systems, ECDSA digital signatures need a base point order and key size of at least 224 bits, preferably the P-384 curve.NCOSP
- ISM-0476Ensuring strong RSA modulus for digital securityOn non-classified, OFFICIAL: Sensitive and PROTECTED systems, RSA keys for digital signatures and for session key transport need a modulus of at least 2048 bits, preferably 3072.NCOSP
- ISM-0477Separate RSA key pairs for different functionsWhen RSA is used both to sign and to transport session keys, signing must use one RSA key pair and key transport a different one.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0479Avoid using ECB mode for symmetric encryptionNever use a symmetric cryptographic algorithm, such as AES, in Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode, which turns identical blocks of plaintext into identical ciphertext.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0994Use ECDH for secure key exchangesUse ECDH rather than DH to agree on encryption session keys, falling back to DH only where ECDH is not available.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1080Use AACAs or high assurance algorithms for encryption at restWhen encrypting data at rest, use an ASD-Approved Cryptographic Algorithm (AACA), such as AES, or a high assurance cryptographic algorithm.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1446Use suitable NIST SP 800-186 curves for elliptic curve cryptographyAny use of elliptic curve cryptography must rely on a suitable curve taken from NIST SP 800-186, never a curve from another source, whatever its size.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1629Select correct modulus for Diffie-Hellman encryptionWherever DH is used to agree on encryption session keys, choose the modulus and associated parameters as NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 3 directs; size alone does not make them compliant.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1759Ensure strong encryption with Diffie-HellmanOn SECRET and TOP SECRET systems, DH used to agree on encryption session keys must have a modulus of at least 3072 bits, with 3072 itself preferred.STS
- ISM-1761Use NIST P-256, P-384 or P-521 curves for ECDH key agreementOn SECRET systems, ECDH used to agree on encryption session keys may use only the NIST P-256, P-384 or P-521 curves, with P-384 preferred.S
- ISM-1762Use NIST P-384 or P-521 curves for ECDH key agreementOn TOP SECRET systems, ECDH used to agree on encryption session keys may use only the NIST P-384 or P-521 curves, with P-384 preferred; P-256 is not allowed.TS
- ISM-1763Use NIST P-256, P-384 or P-521 curves for ECDSA signaturesOn SECRET systems, ECDSA digital signatures may use only the NIST P-256, P-384 or P-521 curves; any other curve is not allowed, and P-384 is preferred.S
- ISM-1764Use NIST P-384 or P-521 curves for ECDSA signaturesOn TOP SECRET systems, ECDSA digital signatures may use only the NIST P-384 or P-521 curves, preferably P-384; P-256 and every other curve are excluded.TS
- ISM-1765Use RSA with 3072-bit modulus for securityOn SECRET and TOP SECRET systems, RSA keys for digital signatures and for session key transport need a modulus of at least 3072 bits, with exactly 3072 preferred.STS
- ISM-1766Use a SHA-2 output size of at least 224 bitsIn non-classified, OFFICIAL: Sensitive and PROTECTED systems, any use of SHA-2 for hashing must have an output of at least 224 bits, with SHA-384 or SHA-512 preferred.NCOSP
- ISM-1767Use SHA-2 with minimum 256-bit outputIn SECRET systems, any use of SHA-2 for hashing must have an output of at least 256 bits, which rules out the 224-bit variants, with SHA-384 or SHA-512 preferred.S
- ISM-1768Use appropriate SHA-2 output size for hashingIn TOP SECRET systems, any use of SHA-2 for hashing must have an output of at least 384 bits, which in practice means SHA-384 or SHA-512.TS
- ISM-1769Using AES encryption with strong key lengthsIn non-classified, OFFICIAL: Sensitive, PROTECTED and SECRET systems, AES encryption must use AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256, with AES-256 preferred.NCOSPS
- ISM-1770Use AES-192 or AES-256 for AES encryptionIn TOP SECRET systems, AES encryption must use AES-192 or AES-256, never AES-128, with AES-256 preferred.TS
- ISM-1917New cryptography supports ML-DSA-87, ML-KEM-1024, SHA-384/512, AES-256 by 2030Any cryptographic equipment, application or library newly built or bought must be able to use ML-DSA-87, ML-KEM-1024, SHA-384, SHA-512 and AES-256 for the functions it performs, by 2030 at the latest.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1990Prefer FIPS 140-3 validated ML-DSA and ML-KEM implementationsWhere ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and ML-KEM (FIPS 203) are used, prefer implementations of each that hold FIPS 140-3 validation; validation is preferred, not required.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1991Use ML-DSA-65 or ML-DSA-87 for ML-DSA digital signaturesML-DSA signatures must use the ML-DSA-65 or ML-DSA-87 parameter set, with ML-DSA-87 preferred; the smallest set, ML-DSA-44, is not allowed.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1992Using hedged variant of ML-DSA for digital signaturesWhenever possible, ML-DSA signing must use the hedged variant, which mixes fresh random data into each signature, rather than the deterministic variant.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1993Use pre-hashed ML-DSA variants only when necessaryUse pre-hashed ML-DSA-65 or ML-DSA-87 only when the default variant's performance is unacceptable; otherwise sign with the default variant.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1994Use correct hashing for ML-DSA pre-hashed variantsWhen pre-hashed ML-DSA is used, pre-hash with SHA-384 or stronger for ML-DSA-65 and SHA-512 or stronger for ML-DSA-87; SHA-384 is not enough for ML-DSA-87.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1995Use ML-KEM-768 or ML-KEM-1024 for ML-KEM key encapsulationML-KEM used to encapsulate session keys or similar keys must use ML-KEM-768 or ML-KEM-1024, with ML-KEM-1024 preferred; ML-KEM-512 is not allowed.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1996Hybrid schemes must include at least one AACAIf a post-quantum traditional hybrid scheme is used, at least one of its algorithms, the post-quantum one or the traditional one, must be an ASD-Approved Cryptographic Algorithm (AACA).NCOSPSTS
- ISM-2073Develop a post-quantum cryptography transition planDevelop a post-quantum cryptography transition plan for moving from traditional asymmetric algorithms to post-quantum ones, then carry it out and keep it current.NCOSPSTS
Cryptographic fundamentals
12 controls- ISM-0142Report cryptographic equipment compromises promptlyReport any compromise of cryptographic equipment or its keying material to the CISO or one of their delegates as soon as possible, including suspected ones not yet confirmed.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0455Enable data recovery for encrypted dataWhere practical, cryptographic equipment, applications and libraries must offer a way to recover encrypted data if the encryption key is lost, damaged or fails.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0457Use PP-evaluated products when encrypting OFFICIAL: Sensitive or PROTECTED mediaWhen encrypting media that holds OFFICIAL: Sensitive or PROTECTED data, use a product evaluated against an ASD-endorsed Protection Profile; other kinds of evaluation do not count.OSP
- ISM-0460Use HACE when encrypting SECRET or TOP SECRET mediaWhen encrypting media that holds SECRET or TOP SECRET data, use HACE; encryption from any product ASD has not authorised as HACE, even an evaluated one, does not meet this.STS
- ISM-0462Treat unlocked IT equipment and media at original sensitivity or classificationOnce a user unlocks the encryption on IT equipment or media, handle it at its original sensitivity or classification until the user deauthenticates.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0465Use PP-evaluated products for OFFICIAL: Sensitive or PROTECTED data in transitProtect OFFICIAL: Sensitive or PROTECTED data sent outside secured networks or areas, or over public networks, with a product evaluated against an ASD-endorsed Protection Profile.OSP
- ISM-0467Using HACE for secure communication of dataSECRET and TOP SECRET data sent beyond networks and areas secured for it, or over public networks such as the internet, must be protected by HACE, not commercial encryption.STS
- ISM-0499Ensure compliance with ASD communication security policiesComply with the communications security doctrine and policy ASD produces for managing and operating HACE, the cryptographic equipment ASD authorises for SECRET and TOP SECRET data.STS
- ISM-0501Transport of keyed cryptographic equipmentTransport keyed cryptographic equipment, meaning equipment with keys loaded, under the rules for the sensitivity or classification of the keying material it holds.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0507Develop and maintain cryptographic key management processesDevelop, implement and maintain cryptographic key management processes and the procedures that support them, covering keys and their hardware and software from generation to destruction.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1091Change keying material when compromisedReplace any keying material that is compromised or suspected of being compromised with new keys; suspicion alone is enough to require the change.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1802Operate approved high assurance cryptographic equipmentEvery HACE must hold an ASD Approval for Use and be operated to the current version of its Australian Communications Security Instructions, moving to each new version ASD issues.STS
Cryptographic protocols
2 controls- ISM-0469Use approved cryptographic protocols when encrypting data in transitWhenever data in transit is encrypted, use an ASD-Approved Cryptographic Protocol (AACP), such as TLS, IPsec or SSH, or a high assurance cryptographic protocol.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0481Restrict cryptographic products to AACPs or high assurance protocolsCryptographic equipment, applications and libraries may use no cryptographic protocol other than an ASD-Approved Cryptographic Protocol (AACP) or a high assurance cryptographic protocol.NCOSPSTS
Internet Protocol Security
9 controls- ISM-0494Use of IPsec tunnel and transport modesUse tunnel mode for IPsec connections, which protects whole IP packets; a connection that uses transport mode instead must also use an IP tunnel.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0496Use ESP protocol for secure IPsec connectionsUse the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol to both authenticate and encrypt IPsec connections; the Authentication Header protocol cannot encrypt.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0498Ensure short lifetimes for IPsec associationsGive every IPsec security association a lifetime of less than four hours (under 14400 seconds), so its keys are replaced within that time; exactly 14400 does not comply.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0998Using integrity algorithms for IPsec connectionsAuthenticate IPsec connections with one of three HMAC-SHA2 integrity algorithms, or set the integrity algorithm to NONE (preferred) but only when AES-GCM is the cipher.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0999Use DH or ECDH for IPsec key establishmentUse DH or ECDH to establish keys for IPsec connections, preferably with a 384-bit random ECP group, a 3072-bit MODP group or a 4096-bit MODP group.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1000Utilising perfect forward secrecy for IPsecUse Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) on every IPsec connection, so each renewal of the traffic keys runs a fresh Diffie-Hellman key exchange.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1233Use IKE version 2 for IPsec key exchangeEstablish the keys for every IPsec connection with Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2); IKE version 1 and manually entered keys do not comply.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1771Use AES encryption for IPsec connectionsEncrypt IPsec connections with AES, preferably ENCR_AES_GCM_16 (AES in Galois/Counter Mode with a 16-byte integrity check); no other cipher is allowed.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1772Use secure pseudorandom functions for IPsec connectionsIPsec connections must use an HMAC with SHA-2 as their pseudorandom function: the 256, 384 or 512-bit option, preferably PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512.NCOSPSTS
Secure Shell
7 controls- ISM-0484Configure SSH for secure server accessConfigure every SSH daemon with all ten listed settings, such as a login timeout of no more than 60 seconds, no direct root login and no connection or X11 forwarding.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0485Use public key authentication for SSH accessAuthenticate every SSH connection with a key pair (public key-based authentication), never with a password alone.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0487Disable certain features for passwordless SSH loginsWhere SSH logins need no password, allow them only from the IP addresses that need access, and switch off port, agent credential and X11 forwarding and console access for them.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0488Use forced commands for SSH without passwordsFor SSH remote access without a password, use the 'forced command' option to fix the command that runs, and have that command check the parameters it receives.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-0489Four-hour cached SSH private key lifetime and screen locksWhen SSH-agent or similar key caching is used, cached private keys must expire within four hours, and screen locks must be used on workstations and servers where applicable.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1449Protect SSH private keys with passwords or encryptionProtect every SSH private key with a password (passphrase) or a key encryption key, so a copied key file cannot be used by itself.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1506Disable SSH version 1 for securityDisable SSH version 1 on every SSH server and client, so no SSH connection can fall back to the original, flawed protocol.NCOSPSTS
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
1 controlTransport Layer Security
9 controls- ISM-1139Require latest version of TLS for securityAllow only the latest TLS version, currently TLS 1.3, on every TLS connection, with TLS 1.2, older versions and all versions of SSL turned off.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1369Ensure TLS connections use AES-GCM encryptionEvery TLS connection must be encrypted with AES-GCM, so cipher suites using other ciphers or modes, such as AES-CBC, AES-CCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305, are turned off.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1370Ensure only server-initiated TLS renegotiationAny TLS renegotiation must be started by the server and use secure renegotiation, so client-initiated renegotiation and older insecure renegotiation are both turned off.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1372Ephemeral DH or ECDH key establishment for TLS connectionsEstablish the keys for every TLS connection with ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE) or ephemeral elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE), not RSA key exchange or static DH or ECDH.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1373Ensure TLS connections do not use anonymous DHTLS connections must never use anonymous Diffie-Hellman, where the server does not prove who it is, so DH_anon cipher suites are turned off on servers and clients, even with a certificate installed.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1374Use SHA-2 certificates for secure TLS connectionsEvery certificate used for TLS connections must be signed using a SHA-2 hash, such as SHA-256 or SHA-384, so certificates signed with SHA-1 or MD5 are replaced.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1375Use SHA-2 for the HMAC and PRF of TLS connectionsTLS connections must use SHA-2 for the HMAC that protects integrity and for the pseudorandom function (PRF) that derives keys, ruling out suites and versions that rely on SHA-1 or MD5.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1453Ensure PFS is enabled for TLS connectionsEvery TLS connection must have Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), so a long-term private key stolen later cannot be used to decrypt sessions recorded earlier.NCOSPSTS
- ISM-1553Disable TLS compression for securityTLS compression must be turned off for every TLS connection, so data is never compressed inside TLS before it is encrypted.NCOSPSTS
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