ASD ISM 0496 Use ESP protocol for secure IPsec connections
What it says
The ESP protocol is used for authentication and encryption of IPsec connections.
Quoted as published. Everything else on this page is written by Control Stack.
In plain English
Use the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol to both authenticate and encrypt IPsec connections; the Authentication Header protocol cannot encrypt.
IPsec connections must use the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol for both authentication, which confirms each packet came unaltered from the expected peer, and encryption, which keeps its contents confidential. The other IPsec protocol, Authentication Header (AH), can authenticate packets but cannot encrypt them, so it does not meet the requirement. ESP with null encryption does not meet it either, and nor does ESP with a cipher but no authentication (AES-GCM authenticates by itself).
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Why it matters
AH can show packets are genuine but leaves their contents readable to anyone on the network path. ESP providing both authentication and encryption keeps the traffic confidential and lets each end discard packets that were altered or forged.
How to implement
Check the protocol in every IPsec proposal.
On each peer, confirm the IPsec (child) proposal uses ESP, not AH, with a non-null encryption algorithm and either an integrity algorithm or AES-GCM (ISM-0998). Include host-to-host policies and links to partners and providers, using your end's live security associations where you cannot see the other side.
Agree the change with the owner of each affected peer.
Partners and providers need to change their side at the same time, or the connection will fail to set up.
Replace AH and weak ESP settings on both ends.
Remove every AH proposal, and any ESP proposal with null encryption or without authentication, so no connection can be set up with them. Use AES for the encryption (ISM-1771).
Keep it running
Recheck the IPsec proposals whenever a connection is added, a peer is replaced or upgraded, or a provider changes its gateway, because a new configuration can bring back AH or null encryption.
Evidence and audit
- Check 1 of 3What an auditor asks for
Ask for
The live security associations on both ends of a sample of IPsec connections, including host-to-host and partner links.
Look at
The protocol, encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm each association uses.
Good evidence
Every sampled association uses ESP with a non-null encryption algorithm and either an approved integrity algorithm or AES-GCM, and none uses AH.
- Check 2 of 3What an auditor asks for
Ask for
A packet capture from the external interface of a sample of IPsec gateways and hosts.
Look at
The IP protocol numbers of the IPsec traffic and whether any payload can be read.
Good evidence
The protected traffic appears only as IP protocol 50 (ESP), or as ESP inside UDP port 4500 where NAT traversal is used, never as IP protocol 51 (AH), and no payload can be read.
- Check 3 of 3What an auditor asks for
Ask for
The IPsec proposals configured on every peer, with the firewall rules that permit IPsec traffic to find peers missing from the list.
Look at
Every protocol and algorithm combination each proposal would accept, including fallbacks.
Good evidence
No proposal on any peer found accepts AH, null encryption or ESP without authentication, so no connection can fall back to them.
Mappings
Closest match in ISO/IEC 27001: A.8.24, Use of cryptography, which this control partially meets.
ISO/IEC 27001: 1 mapping
This control partially meets A.8.24.
ISM-0496 requires the ESP protocol to be used to provide encryption and authentication for IPsec connections. Annex A 8.24 requires an organisation to define and implement rules for the effective use of cryptography and cryptographic key management across the environment. ISM-0496 is a specific technical instantiation of cryptography-in-transit within one protocol suite (IPsec/ESP), whereas Annex A 8.24 is broader and also covers algorithm choices, key lifecycles, and governance beyond IPsec.
Mappings show how controls relate across frameworks. They do not imply full equivalence or certification.




