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Cryptography
ASD ISMISM-0496

ASD ISM 0496 Use ESP protocol for secure IPsec connections

What it says

The ESP protocol is used for authentication and encryption of IPsec connections.

Quoted as published. Everything else on this page is written by Control Stack.

In plain English

Use the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol to both authenticate and encrypt IPsec connections; the Authentication Header protocol cannot encrypt.

IPsec connections must use the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol for both authentication, which confirms each packet came unaltered from the expected peer, and encryption, which keeps its contents confidential. The other IPsec protocol, Authentication Header (AH), can authenticate packets but cannot encrypt them, so it does not meet the requirement. ESP with null encryption does not meet it either, and nor does ESP with a cipher but no authentication (AES-GCM authenticates by itself).

Why it matters

AH can show packets are genuine but leaves their contents readable to anyone on the network path. ESP providing both authentication and encryption keeps the traffic confidential and lets each end discard packets that were altered or forged.

How to implement

  1. Check the protocol in every IPsec proposal.

    On each peer, confirm the IPsec (child) proposal uses ESP, not AH, with a non-null encryption algorithm and either an integrity algorithm or AES-GCM (ISM-0998). Include host-to-host policies and links to partners and providers, using your end's live security associations where you cannot see the other side.

  2. Agree the change with the owner of each affected peer.

    Partners and providers need to change their side at the same time, or the connection will fail to set up.

  3. Replace AH and weak ESP settings on both ends.

    Remove every AH proposal, and any ESP proposal with null encryption or without authentication, so no connection can be set up with them. Use AES for the encryption (ISM-1771).

Keep it running

Recheck the IPsec proposals whenever a connection is added, a peer is replaced or upgraded, or a provider changes its gateway, because a new configuration can bring back AH or null encryption.

Evidence and audit

  1. Check 1 of 3What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    The live security associations on both ends of a sample of IPsec connections, including host-to-host and partner links.

    Look at

    The protocol, encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm each association uses.

    Good evidence

    Every sampled association uses ESP with a non-null encryption algorithm and either an approved integrity algorithm or AES-GCM, and none uses AH.

  2. Check 2 of 3What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    A packet capture from the external interface of a sample of IPsec gateways and hosts.

    Look at

    The IP protocol numbers of the IPsec traffic and whether any payload can be read.

    Good evidence

    The protected traffic appears only as IP protocol 50 (ESP), or as ESP inside UDP port 4500 where NAT traversal is used, never as IP protocol 51 (AH), and no payload can be read.

  3. Check 3 of 3What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    The IPsec proposals configured on every peer, with the firewall rules that permit IPsec traffic to find peers missing from the list.

    Look at

    Every protocol and algorithm combination each proposal would accept, including fallbacks.

    Good evidence

    No proposal on any peer found accepts AH, null encryption or ESP without authentication, so no connection can fall back to them.

Mappings

Closest match in ISO/IEC 27001: A.8.24, Use of cryptography, which this control partially meets.

ISO 27001

ISO/IEC 27001: 1 mapping

  • A.8.24Use of cryptographyPartially meets

Mappings show how controls relate across frameworks. They do not imply full equivalence or certification.