ASD ISM 1448 Use the ephemeral variant when TLS uses DH or ECDH
Rescinded in the September 2026 ISM
ISM-1448 is no longer part of the ISM. This page keeps it for reference, for organisations still working to an earlier version.
The existing security control recommending that when using DH or ECDH for key establishment of TLS connections that the ephemeral variant be used was merged into the security control recommending DH or ECDH be used for key establishment of TLS connections.
Its requirement now sits in ISM-1372: Ephemeral DH or ECDH key establishment for TLS connections.
What it said
When using DH or ECDH for key establishment of TLS connections, the ephemeral variant is used.
Quoted as published. The guidance below is written by Control Stack.
In plain English
Under ISM editions that included it, TLS connections that set up keys with DH or ECDH had to use the ephemeral variant, with fresh keys for each connection.
The control required TLS connections whose keys were established with Diffie-Hellman (DH) or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) to use the ephemeral variant. Ephemeral means both sides generate a fresh key pair for each connection and discard it afterwards, rather than the server reusing a fixed key from its certificate. Connections that used neither DH nor ECDH fell outside its wording. ISM-1372 now requires the ephemeral variant of DH or ECDH for key establishment of every TLS connection.
Why it matters
With static DH or ECDH, one server key protects every connection, so anyone who records traffic and later obtains that key can decrypt all of it. Ephemeral keys are discarded after each connection, so a stolen server key cannot decrypt recorded sessions.
How to implement
List every TLS endpoint and client on the system.
Cover web servers, load balancers, APIs, mail and directory services, and software that opens outbound TLS connections, such as proxies. Compare the list with a network scan for TLS services, so none is missed.
Scan each endpoint for the key exchanges it accepts.
Use a TLS scanner to list every accepted protocol version and cipher suite. In TLS 1.2, ephemeral suites show DHE or ECDHE in their names, while static ones, such as TLS_DH_RSA and TLS_ECDH_ECDSA suites, use a fixed key from the certificate. TLS 1.3 has no static DH or ECDH.
Remove static DH and ECDH suites from servers and clients.
Edit the cipher suite list in each server, load balancer and TLS library so every DH or ECDH suite left is DHE or ECDHE, keeping anonymous DH off (ISM-1373). For a cloud or bought service, select a provider TLS policy that includes no static DH or ECDH suites.
Rescan and test each change.
Repeat the scan, then try a handshake offering only static DH or ECDH suites, which the endpoint should refuse. Where a device or provider cannot drop static suites, record it as a shortfall and upgrade, replace or reconfigure it.
Keep it running
Rescan TLS endpoints after software upgrades, new deployments and changes to load balancer or provider TLS policies, since defaults can bring static suites back. Add each new TLS endpoint to the scan list when it goes live.
Evidence and audit
- Check 1 of 2What an auditor asks for
Ask for
The assessor's own TLS scan, using a scanner that offers static DH and ECDH suites, of every TLS service found by a network scan, compared with the system's list of TLS endpoints.
Look at
Whether every service found is listed, and the key exchange used by each accepted protocol version and cipher suite.
Good evidence
Every TLS service found is listed, and wherever DH or ECDH is accepted it is only the ephemeral variant (DHE, ECDHE or a TLS 1.3 key share), with no static DH or ECDH suite accepted.
- Check 2 of 2What an auditor asks for
Ask for
A captured ClientHello from each sampled client that opens outbound connections, such as proxies and applications calling APIs.
Look at
Which key exchanges each client offers.
Good evidence
No sampled client offers a static DH or ECDH suite, so it cannot agree one with a server that still accepts them.




