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PRO-12 Least privilege access
ASD EssentialsIT.PRO-12.2

ASD Essentials IT.PRO-12.2 Restrict account and role management and privileged functions to authorised administrative roles

What it says

Grant only authorised administrative roles permissions to create, modify or delete accounts and roles, and access privileged functions or applications.

Quoted as published. Everything else on this page is written by Control Stack.

In plain English

No account outside an authorised administrative role may create, change or delete accounts and roles, or access privileged functions or applications.

Your organisation must grant two sets of permissions only to authorised administrative roles, meaning the roles it has approved to administer systems:

  • Account and role management: creating, modifying or deleting accounts and roles.
  • Privileged access: accessing privileged functions or applications, the ones that can control other systems, data or security settings, such as admin portals, security tools and backup consoles.

Delegated permissions and service accounts count: a help desk group or provisioning service that can modify accounts must itself hold an authorised administrative role.

Where this action applies

What's in each domain?

ASD orders the work by domain: apply this action to each ticked domain, phase by phase.

Phase 3
  • Business systems (does not apply)
  • User devices (does not apply)

Why it matters

If an ordinary account can create accounts or change roles, an attacker who takes it over can make themselves an administrator and stay in after a password reset. Keeping these permissions in authorised administrative roles means a stolen ordinary account does not carry that power.

How to implement

  1. List privileged functions and applications, and who and what holds these permissions.

    Treat anything that can control other systems, data or security settings as privileged, such as security tools and backup consoles. Export role assignments from each identity provider, directory, cloud tenant, business application and console. Include nested groups, custom roles, delegated permissions and service accounts.

  2. Define and approve the administrative roles.

    For each role, record what it may do, which accounts, roles, functions and applications it covers, and who approved it. Scope delegated roles narrowly: a help desk role might reset passwords in one business unit without being able to create accounts or change roles.

  3. Remove these permissions from everything outside those roles.

    Take them off ordinary users, broad groups and leftover delegations, testing first so a business process does not break. Check defaults, such as a setting that lets any user invite guest accounts. Where a bought service has only one broad administrator role, limit it to authorised administrators and record why.

  4. Require recorded approval to join an administrative role.

    Route membership requests through an access request tool or ticket, so each one traces to a decision. Decide which changes count as high-impact, such as adding an administrator to the identity platform itself, and enforce an approval workflow for them where the platform supports it.

Keep it running

Re-check effective permissions after a platform update adds new built-in roles, a new application goes live or a restructure changes who holds delegated permissions. IT.PRO-12.1 sets the periodic review of access privileges.

Evidence and audit

  1. Check 1 of 5What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    A live export of effective permissions from each identity platform and a sample of applications chosen from sign-on records.

    Look at

    Who holds permission to create, modify or delete accounts and roles, counting nested groups, custom roles, delegations and service accounts, compared with the list of authorised administrative roles.

    Good evidence

    Every user, group and service account with permission to create, modify or delete accounts and roles holds it through a role on the authorised list, and nothing else does.

  2. Check 2 of 5What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    A demonstration using an ordinary user account with no administrative role.

    Look at

    Attempts to create an account, change a role and open a privileged function or application, through the admin portal, the command line and the API.

    Good evidence

    Every attempt is refused on every route tried, including the command line and the API, not only the portal.

  3. Check 3 of 5What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    The platform's own audit log of account and role changes for a recent period.

    Look at

    Who made each create, modify and delete, matched to the membership of the authorised administrative roles at that time.

    Good evidence

    The log includes known changes, such as recent joiners' accounts, and each change to another account or to a role was made by a member of an authorised administrative role.

  4. Check 4 of 5What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    Applications and consoles found in sign-on logs, network discovery and the cloud service inventory, compared with the list of privileged functions and applications.

    Look at

    Anything that can control other systems or data but is missing from the list, such as backup consoles, virtualisation management and security tools, and who can reach each one.

    Good evidence

    Every privileged function or application found is on the list, and only authorised administrative roles can access it.

  5. Check 5 of 5What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    Delegated permission assignments, with the approval record for each.

    Look at

    The live scope of each delegation compared with what the approved role allows.

    Good evidence

    Each delegation traces to an approved administrative role, and its live scope is no wider than that role allows.

ASD indicators of good practice (7)

The indicators below are quoted as published from ASD's Assessment evidence guide for enterprise IT. These optional indicators help an assessor judge the action in each domain where it applies: if any not effective statement is true, the action is rated not effective; if every applicable fully effective statement is true and no other statement is, it is rated fully effective; otherwise it is rated partially effective. ASD says the indicators "do not replace expert judgement, nor are they intended to serve as a checklist".

Not effective(2)

  • NE-1Non-administrative users can create, modify or delete accounts or roles.
  • NE-2Delegated permissions are broad and have not been audited.

Partially effective(2)

  • PE-1Permissions are restricted to administrative roles but some delegated permissions are broader than required.
  • PE-2Approval workflows exist for some high-impact changes but not all.

Fully effective(3)

  • FE-1Only designated administrative roles can create, modify or delete accounts and roles.
  • FE-2Delegated permissions are audited and scoped to the minimum required.
  • FE-3Approval workflows are enforced for high-impact identity and access changes.

Mappings

Closest match in ISO/IEC 27001: A.5.18, Access rights, which this control partially meets.

ISO 27001

ISO/IEC 27001: 2 mappings

  • A.5.18Access rightsPartially meets
  • A.8.2Privileged access rightsPartially meets
Essential Eight

ASD Essential Eight: 3 mappings

ASD ISM

ASD Information Security Manual: 1 mapping

Mappings show how controls relate across frameworks. They do not imply full equivalence or certification.