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DET-01 Centralised event logging
ASD EssentialsIT.DET-01.2

ASD Essentials IT.DET-01.2 Forward high-value security logs and configuration changes to central log storage

What it says

Forward high-value, security-relevant event logs and configuration changes from infrastructure, operating systems and applications to a central log storage capability.

Quoted as published. Everything else on this page is written by Control Stack.

What it means

In plain English

Have infrastructure, operating systems and applications send their high-value, security-relevant event logs and configuration changes to a central log store.

Your organisation must forward high-value, security-relevant event logs and configuration changes to a central log storage capability (one place that holds logs from many systems). They must come from all three of infrastructure, operating systems and applications. Your organisation decides which logs and changes count as high-value, such as sign-ins and privilege changes, based on what helps detect and investigate cyber security events, so not every log line has to be sent. IT.DET-01.3 covers setting up the store.

Where this action applies

What's in each domain?

ASD orders the work by domain: apply this action to each ticked domain, phase by phase.

Why it matters

A disabled security setting or a cleared log stays invisible while the records sit only on the compromised system. Forwarding keeps a separate copy and gives analysts one place to detect and investigate events across systems.

How to implement

  1. Decide which event logs and configuration changes count as high-value.

    Start with what detection logic must identify: unauthorised changes, anomalous authentication and suspicious software execution (IT.DET-02.2). Add what an investigator would need to trace an intruder's steps. Record what you leave out and why, so each gap is a decision.

  2. List the sources expected to send each log type.

    Start from your asset records (IT.IDE-01.2) and cover infrastructure, operating systems and applications, including cloud and other bought services. Record the forwarding method for each, because this list is what you later test completeness against.

  3. Turn on high-value events at source, then forward them.

    Many systems do not record them by default, so change the audit settings first. Forward by agent, syslog over TLS or API connector, often enough to meet your triage time limits (IT.DET-03.1). Where a bought service offers none of these, schedule an export or raise the gap with the provider.

  4. Forward configuration changes as their own log source.

    Send the change records from management consoles, cloud control planes, network devices and configuration tools. IT.PRO-05.3 requires administrative changes to be recorded with user, timestamp and target; this action gets those records to central storage.

  5. Test what arrives against the expected source list.

    Generate a known event on a sample of each source type and confirm it reaches central storage. Alert when a source stops sending, and investigate any listed source with no recent events.

Keep it running

A source that stops sending looks the same as a quiet system, so alert on silence. Recheck the source list at an interval your organisation sets, and whenever a system goes live, a logging agent changes or an incident exposes a missing record.

Evidence and audit

  1. Check 1 of 4What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    An asset discovery report and the application records, compared with the central platform's list of sources and the date each last sent events.

    Look at

    Items with no recent events of their own, across infrastructure, operating systems and applications, including an application on a host that forwards only its operating system logs.

    Good evidence

    Every system and application in those records, across all three source types, sent its own events during the period reviewed or has a recorded reason for exclusion.

  2. Check 2 of 4What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    A live test of a failed sign-in and a privilege change on a server, a network device and an application chosen by the assessor.

    Look at

    Whether each test event appears in central storage and how long it takes to arrive.

    Good evidence

    Each test event from all three source types is found in central storage, soon enough to meet the triage times your organisation has set.

  3. Check 3 of 4What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    A sample of approved change records, plus one harmless setting changed during the check.

    Look at

    Whether each change appears centrally as a configuration change, including the test change and changes to infrastructure, operating systems and applications.

    Good evidence

    The sample includes changes to infrastructure, operating systems and applications, and each of them and the test change appear in central storage.

  4. Check 4 of 4What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    The list of log types chosen as high-value and the reasons for any exclusions, tested against a recent incident or a simulated attack.

    Look at

    Whether an analyst can follow the sequence of events using central storage alone.

    Good evidence

    The analyst traces each step of the incident or simulation from central storage, without logging on to the source systems, and each exclusion has a recorded reason.

ASD indicators of good practice (10)

The indicators below are quoted as published from ASD's Assessment evidence guide for enterprise IT. These optional indicators help an assessor judge the action in each domain where it applies: if any not effective statement is true, the action is rated not effective; if every applicable fully effective statement is true and no other statement is, it is rated fully effective; otherwise it is rated partially effective. ASD says the indicators "do not replace expert judgement, nor are they intended to serve as a checklist".

Not effective(2)

  • NE-1Security-relevant logs from assets are not forwarded to a central logging capability.
  • NE-2High-value, security-relevant event logs or configuration changes from infrastructure, operating systems or applications are not forwarded.

Partially effective(4)

  • PE-1High-value, security-relevant event logs are forwarded, but coverage gaps are identified or completeness has not been validated.
  • PE-2Configuration change logs are forwarded inconsistently.
  • PE-3The utility of security log sources is reviewed, but on an ad hoc basis rather than according to a defined schedule.
  • PE-4Log forwarding is in place but latency is excessive for effective detection.

Fully effective(4)

  • FE-1High-value security-relevant event logs and configuration changes from all relevant infrastructure, operating systems and application sources are forwarded to the central logging capability.
  • FE-2Security log sources are reviewed at regular intervals to ensure their continued utility in detecting and responding to changing adversary techniques.
  • FE-3Log completeness has been validated against the expected log sources.
  • FE-4Logs are forwarded at a frequency that enables timely detection.

Mappings

Closest match in ISO/IEC 27001: A.8.15, Logging, which this control partially meets.

ISO 27001

ISO/IEC 27001: 1 mapping

  • A.8.15LoggingPartially meets
Essential Eight

ASD Essential Eight: 6 mappings

ASD ISM

ASD Information Security Manual: 3 mappings

Mappings show how controls relate across frameworks. They do not imply full equivalence or certification.