Harden Software Isolation Mechanisms Sharing Physical Computing Resources
A software-based isolation mechanism is software (such as a hypervisor or container engine) that lets multiple workloads share the same physical computing resources (the same processor, memory and storage) while keeping them separated from each other. Because everything runs on shared hardware, a weakness in this software could let one workload reach another's data or take over the underlying system. This control requires you to harden the isolation mechanism's configuration in two specific ways. First, remove any functionality that is not needed, so there are fewer features an attacker could exploit. Second, restrict access to the administrative interface (the management console or controls used to configure and run the isolation mechanism) so that only authorised people can change how it works.
Plain language
When you run several systems on the same physical machine, special software keeps them apart so they cannot interfere with each other. This software has to be locked down. There are two things to do. The first is to turn off any features the software offers that your business does not actually use, because every switched-on feature is something an attacker could try to misuse. The second is to make sure that only trusted, authorised staff can reach the management controls that configure the software. If you leave unused features running, or let too many people into the management controls, an attacker could break out of one system, reach data that belongs to another, or take over the whole shared machine.
Framework
ASD Information Security Manual (ISM)
Control effect
Preventative
Classifications
NC, OS, P, S, TS
ISM last updated
June 2026
Control Stack last updated
18 June 2026
E8 maturity levels
N/A
Guideline
Guidelines for system hardeningSection
Virtualisation HardeningOfficial control statement
When using a software-based isolation mechanism that consumes shared physical computing resources, the configuration of the isolation mechanism is hardened by removing unneeded functionality and restricting access to the administrative interface used to manage the isolation mechanism.
Why it matters
If unused features stay enabled or too many people reach the management controls, an attacker could break out of one workload, read another's data, or take over the shared machine.
Operational notes
Re-check the live configuration against the hardened baseline on a set schedule, since updates or new workloads can re-enable removed features or widen admin access.
Implementation tips
- System administrators should produce a baseline configuration for the isolation mechanism (for example the hypervisor or container engine) that lists every feature, service and capability it offers, then disable everything not required for business use.
- The platform team should turn off optional functions that are commonly unused on shared-resource isolation software, such as unnecessary device pass-through, clipboard or file sharing between guests, legacy network services, and unused management plugins or APIs.
- Identity administrators should restrict the administrative interface so only named, authorised individuals can reach it, using role-based access so each person has only the management rights their job needs.
- Network engineers should place the administrative interface on a separate, controlled management network and block it from general user networks and the internet, so the controls cannot be reached from where workloads run.
- The configuration owner should record each hardening change with the reason it was made, and re-check the live configuration against the hardened baseline on a set schedule so removed features are not quietly re-enabled.
Audit / evidence tips
- Askthe team to name the software-based isolation mechanisms that share physical computing resources and to show the hardened configuration baseline for eachLook ata documented list of features with unneeded ones marked disabled and a reason recordedGoodpairs each removed feature with its business justification and a date
- Askhow they decided which functionality was unneededLook ata feature-by-feature review against business requirements rather than default vendor settings left in placeGoodreferences a vendor hardening guide or benchmark and shows defaults that were deliberately turned off
- Askwho can reach the administrative interface and how access is grantedLook ata short list of named, authorised administrators with role-based permissionsGoodshows access is limited by role and that general users and unused accounts cannot reach the management controls
- Askhow the administrative interface is protected from being reached by ordinary workloads or external networksLook atnetwork separation, firewall rules or an isolated management networkGooddemonstrates the interface is unreachable from user and guest networks
- Askhow they confirm the hardening stays in place over timeLook atperiodic checks comparing the live configuration against the hardened baselineGoodshows dated review records and evidence that any drift (re-enabled features or added admin access) was corrected
Cross-framework mappings
How ISM-1604 relates to controls across ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, Essential Eight, and ASD ISM.
ISO 27001
| Control | Notes | Details |
|---|---|---|
layersPartially meets(3)expand_less | ||
| Annex A 5.15 | ISM-1604 requires hardening of the virtual server isolation mechanism and restricting access to the administrative interface used to mana... | |
| Annex A 8.3 | ISM-1604 requires hardening of the virtual isolation mechanism and restricting access to its administrative interface | |
| Annex A 8.9 | ISM-1604 requires a hardened configuration for the software-based isolation mechanism, including removing unneeded functionality and rest... | |
handshakeSupports(3)expand_less | ||
| Annex A 5.18 | ISM-1604 requires that access to the administrative interface of the software isolation mechanism is restricted as part of hardening | |
| Annex A 8.2 | ISM-1604 requires restricting access to the administrative interface used to manage the isolation mechanism, reducing who can administer ... | |
| Annex A 8.20 | ISM-1604 requires hardening the virtualisation/isolation mechanism and restricting administrative interface access, which often includes ... | |
E8
| Control | Notes | Details |
|---|---|---|
handshakeSupports(2)expand_less | ||
| E8-RA-ML2.4 | ISM-1604 requires the administrative interface for the isolation mechanism (e.g | |
| E8-RA-ML3.3 | ISM-1604 requires the virtualisation/isolation mechanism to be hardened by removing unneeded functionality and restricting access to the ... | |
These mappings show relationships between controls across frameworks. They do not imply full equivalence or certification.
Related ASD ISM controls in System hardening
See all Guidelines for system hardening controls, or browse the full ASD ISM library.