Skip to content
Security assurance
ASD ISMISM-2116

ASD ISM 2116 Use cyber threat intelligence for event detection

What it says

Cyber threat intelligence services are used to support the detection of cyber security events and the identification of cyber security incidents.

Quoted as published. Everything else on this page is written by Control Stack.

What it means

In plain English

Cyber threat intelligence is fed into log monitoring and detection tooling so that matches against known indicators help detect cyber security events and identify cyber security incidents.

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is information about known attacker indicators, such as malicious IP addresses, domains, file hashes, and attacker techniques. This control is about loading that intelligence into your log monitoring and detection tools so that when your logs show activity matching a known indicator, an alert is raised. It is a detection control, not a prevention one: its job is to help you spot and confirm that a cyber security event or incident is occurring, not to block it.

Why it matters

If cyber threat intelligence is not ingested into log monitoring and detection tooling, indicators of compromise (IOCs) and attacker techniques that appear in collected logs pass unmatched, so connections to known malicious infrastructure, known-bad file hashes, and recognised attacker tradecraft go unflagged. Cyber security events tied to known threats are missed in the noise of normal log volume, and genuine incidents are identified late or only after damage is done, extending attacker dwell time.

How to implement

  1. Subscribe to or connect at least one cyber threat intelligence source (commercial feed, ACSC/government advisories, or an open feed such as MISP via STIX/TAXII) and configure it to deliver IOCs and attacker TTPs into your SIEM or detection platform.

  2. Configure automated, scheduled ingestion of indicators (malicious IP addresses, domains, URLs, file hashes) into the SIEM so the indicator set refreshes without manual effort and stale indicators are aged out.

  3. Build correlation or detection rules that compare collected log data (firewall, proxy, DNS, endpoint, authentication, and email logs) against ingested indicators and raise an alert on any match.

  4. Map your ingested indicator types to the log sources you actually collect, and add any missing telemetry (for example enable DNS or proxy logging) so domain and URL indicators have data to match against.

  5. Wire CTI-match alerts into your event triage and incident-identification workflow so a confirmed indicator match is escalated and recorded as a candidate cyber security incident.

  6. Tune CTI-driven rules to suppress known false positives and de-prioritise low-confidence or expired indicators, and review match volumes so analysts focus on high-confidence detections.

Keep it running

Treat CTI ingestion as a continuously maintained detection capability, not a one-off setup: indicator feeds change constantly, so keep automated feed updates running and confirm new indicators reach the SIEM and detection rules. Tune CTI-driven alert rules to suppress known false positives and stale indicators so analysts are not buried, and age out or retire indicators on a defined schedule. Periodically validate that an IOC match in collected logs actually fires an alert and is triaged into the event-to-incident workflow, and align ingested intelligence (IP, domain, hash, URL, TTP feeds) with the log sources you actually collect so there is something to match against.

Evidence and audit

  1. Check 1 of 5What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    Ask for a demonstration of the cyber threat intelligence feed integration with the SIEM or detection tooling, including the connector or integration configuration.

    Look at

    Look at whether at least one cyber threat intelligence feed is actually ingested, and check the timestamp of the last successful indicator update.

    Good evidence

    At least one feed is configured and active, and the last successful indicator update is recent and within the organisation's expected refresh cycle.

  2. Check 2 of 5What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    Ask for a sample of CTI detection or correlation rules from the SIEM or detection tooling.

    Look at

    Look at whether the rules match collected log fields (source or destination IP, domain, URL, file hash, or TTP) against current indicators, and whether they are set to raise an alert when matched.

    Good evidence

    The sampled rules compare live log fields against current indicators and generate an alert on a match rather than logging silently.

  3. Check 3 of 5What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    Ask for a demonstration tracing one CTI indicator match end to end, starting from a logged match against a known-bad indicator.

    Look at

    Look at whether the match generated an alert and whether that alert entered the event triage and incident-identification workflow.

    Good evidence

    The indicator match produced an alert that was triaged, and the record shows how the event was assessed for whether it was a cyber security incident.

  4. Check 4 of 5What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    Ask for the list of ingested indicator types and the inventory of log sources collected by the detection tooling.

    Look at

    Look at whether the indicator types align with the log sources collected, for example that domain and URL indicators have proxy or DNS logs to match against.

    Good evidence

    Each ingested indicator type has a corresponding log source available, so matching is actually possible rather than indicators sitting unused.

  5. Check 5 of 5What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    Ask for a sample of incident records where cyber threat intelligence contributed to identifying the incident.

    Look at

    Look at whether the matching indicator is recorded in the incident record and whether it is traceable back to the source log.

    Good evidence

    Incident records name the specific indicator that contributed to identification and link it to the source log entry, showing CTI supported the identification of the incident.

Mappings

Closest match in ASD Essential Eight: E8-RA-ML3.8, Timely analysis of event logs from non-internet-facing servers, which this control covers in full and more.

ISO 27001

ISO/IEC 27001: 4 mappings

Essential Eight

ASD Essential Eight: 3 mappings

ASD Essentials

ASD Essentials for enterprise IT: 4 mappings

Mappings show how controls relate across frameworks. They do not imply full equivalence or certification.