Coverage
Is the action applied to every relevant asset in the domain?
Our example gap: Scanning reaches every server except those on one isolated network segment.

ASD's eight prioritised mitigation strategies, at three maturity levels.
152 requirements

The Australian Government's Information Security Manual, guideline by guideline.
1,143 controls
Check
An Essentials assessment asks one question: is each action actually working, for the assets where it applies? This guide explains ASD's assessment process in plain English.
Reviewed 17 October 2026 · Current to ASD's Assessment process guide, published 15 October 2026

You rate each action in each domain it applies to. Nothing is rated once for the whole organisation.
There are four ratings: not assessed, not effective, partially effective and fully effective. There is no maturity level. If a regulator, contract or other obligation still requires Essential Eight work or reporting, ASD says to keep meeting it (see keeping the Essential Eight running).
ASD's indicators of good practice describe each rating except not assessed. One true not effective indicator normally means a not effective rating.
A principle takes the lowest rating of its actions in a domain. Each domain then gets a percentage score.
Evidence must show the action working, not just switched on. Start with the evidence you already hold.
Every report needs a summary view and a detailed view, set out by priority phase and domain.
ASD's process is for assessing your own environment, in any Essentials chapter. Our examples use the enterprise IT chapter and a fictional 300-person council.
The approach depends on your environment's scope, size and complexity, but ASD says the same four stages always apply.
Planning and preparation
Agree the scope, bring in the people involved and write an assessment plan.
Plan approval
An appropriate authority approves the plan, including any testing, before work starts.
Assessment
Assess each domain in scope. Rate each applicable action against the assets in that domain.
Aggregation and reporting
Roll the action ratings up to principle ratings, then report the findings.
First, agree which domains and assets are in scope. You can assess one domain, several or all of them, and you need not follow priority phase order. Write down anything you leave out, and why.
Then bring in the people involved, such as system owners, the security team and any managed service providers. Ask third parties early for access and evidence, as ASD warns this often takes time. The process is not for assessing your suppliers. ASD says guidance on that will come later.
ASD's list, in our words.
An appropriate authority in the organisation approves the plan, including any testing or tools, before work starts, and again if it changes materially. Record anything that limits the assessment, such as access you could not get, so the report can include it.
The assessor rates each applicable action in each domain in scope, recording the evidence relied on and, below fully effective, the specific gaps. If the plan allows sampling, they note which assets they checked and why. Then they roll the ratings up and report, as the scoring and reporting sections explain.
No. ASD does not require an independent assessor, but says you may choose one where proportionate and affordable. It does recommend periodic independent assessment in your reassessment cycle, particularly where external assurance is required. ASD's process also does not replace any regulatory or compliance requirements, so check whether a regulator or contract asks for one.
ASD says assessors "do not assess controls in isolation." Each rating joins three layers: the principle is the outcome, the action is what you do, and the domain sets which assets get checked. Our overview explains how principles, actions and domains fit together.
PRO-06Vulnerability management
Vulnerabilities in systems (infrastructure, operating systems, applications and data) are identified, documented, validated and prioritised for remediation or mitigation in a timely manner, with all remediation and mitigation actions verified for effectiveness.
IT.PRO-06.2
Apply security patches or updates within defined risk-based timeframes or automatically where operational impact is low.
IT.PRO-06.2 applies in 6 domains:
ASD's three questions for assessing an action, quoted
ASD, Assessment process guide
Each action gets one of four ratings in each domain it applies to. The action rating asks whether the outcome is achieved across the assets in scope, not whether a specific control is in place.
Not assessed
Not checked yet, or not enough evidence to judge. It is neutral, not a fail.
Missing, or in place but not delivering the outcome for the assets in scope.
A real security benefit, but gaps in coverage, consistency or enforcement remain. A plan, or work just started, does not count.
Delivers the outcome across the whole domain, and the evidence shows it.
The action rating scale, quoted
ASD, Assessment process guide, The action rating scale
For every action, ASD's Assessment evidence guide for enterprise IT describes what each rating except not assessed looks like. These short statements are the indicators of good practice, or IGPs. There are 529 across 58 actions, each listed on our enterprise IT page.
ASD calls the indicators optional, and says:
The IGPs do not replace expert judgement, nor are they intended to serve as a checklist.
If the assessor uses the indicators, ASD's rule turns them into a rating in three checks, in order.
Is any not effective statement true?
Yes: the action is not effective. No: go to step 2.
Is any partially effective statement true, or an applicable fully effective one not true?
Yes: the action is partially effective. No: go to step 3.
Every applicable fully effective statement is true.
The action is fully effective.
ASD does not say when a statement is not applicable. Our suggestion: set one aside only when the situation it describes does not arise in the domain, and record why. For example, FE-3 in the worked example below applies only where something prevents timely patching.
ASD's rating rule for the indicators, quoted
ASD, Assessment evidence guide for enterprise IT
ASD's own example is patching in Identity services. An attacker who takes over a domain controller, federation service or certificate authority can gain broad access. The assessor checks patching for these assets, not across the whole organisation, using ASD's indicators for IT.PRO-06.2 under PRO-06 Vulnerability management.
The action: Apply security patches or updates within defined risk-based timeframes or automatically where operational impact is low.
Not effective
Partially effective
Fully effective
ASD, Assessment evidence guide for enterprise IT, IT.PRO-06.2
The indicators cannot foresee every setup, so the assessor stays responsible for the rating. ASD says to assess the outcome achieved: a setup that differs from the indicators is still fully effective if the evidence shows it achieves the outcome.
A single not effective statement is normally decisive, with one exception:
A material failure represented by a not effective statement will normally result in a not effective rating. Where a compensating arrangement demonstrably achieves the action’s intended outcome, the assessor may assign a higher rating if the rationale and supporting evidence are documented.
A compensating arrangement is a different measure that still delivers the outcome. For example, a system that cannot be patched might be cut off so attackers cannot reach it. When departing from the indicators, ASD says to record the outcome achieved, the evidence relied on and any compensating arrangements.
Each domain is assessed on its own, against its own assets and risks, so the same action can earn a different rating in each domain. A good result in one domain does not carry across to another.
Where possible, the assessor starts from the scope you set when implementing and checks it is accurate, complete and current. An incomplete scope can give misleading results, so big gaps are recorded as findings. An asset that supports more than one domain is included in each and assessed separately in each. Our scoping guide covers recording your scope and assets in more than one domain.
For each action that applies in the domain, ASD asks the assessor to check four things, which it calls the assessment dimensions.
Is the action applied to every relevant asset in the domain?
Our example gap: Scanning reaches every server except those on one isolated network segment.
Is it applied the same way across those assets?
Our example gap: Head office laptops get patches within days. Depot laptops wait until someone remembers.
Is the evidence recent enough to show how things work today?
Our example gap: The last restore test was 18 months ago, before the backup system changed.
Is the evidence reliable and relevant enough to show the outcome?
Our example gap: A policy saying backups are tested is weak. Signed restore test records are much stronger.
Gaps in coverage or consistency may stop an action reaching fully effective. For a partially effective rating, the assessor writes the gaps down so fixes can be planned.
A domain is considered to be addressed when all applicable actions are operating as intended and are rated as fully effective.
Ratings roll up in two steps: action ratings become principle ratings, then principle ratings become a percentage for the domain, which we call the domain score. ASD's example summary table labels the same figure "% effective".
One domain, four principles
Illustration, not ASD data
| Principle | 1. Action ratings | 2. Lowest rating | 3. Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| Principle A |
| FEFully effective | 1 |
| Principle B |
| FEFully effective | 1 |
| Principle C |
| PEPartially effective | 0.5 |
| Principle D |
| NENot effective | 0 |
4. Domain score
(1 + 1 + 0.5 + 0) ÷ 4 principles = 2.5 of 4, which is
62.5%
Not assessed has no score. ASD reports it in its own column, and a domain with nothing assessed shows N/A, not 0%.
Within a domain, a principle takes the lowest rating of its applicable actions. ASD calls this the weakest link rule, because one material gap can limit the whole principle.
Each principle rating gets a score: 0 for not effective, 0.5 for partially effective and 1 for fully effective. Add up the scores, then divide by the number of applicable principles in the domain.
ASD's example: Visibility and response
5 fully effective × 1 = 5.
4 partially effective × 0.5 = 2.
1 not effective × 0 = 0.
Total 7, divided by 10 principles = 70%.
Use not assessed when the evidence is too thin to tell whether the outcome is achieved, and record why. Use not effective when the evidence shows the outcome is not achieved. Not assessed has no score, and ASD says it "must remain distinguishable from not effective in all reporting."
A principle can be partially or fully effective only once all its applicable actions in the domain are assessed. One not effective action makes it not effective straight away. Otherwise, while any of its actions is still not assessed, so is the principle. A domain you have not assessed yet is recorded as not assessed across all its applicable principles, which ASD says reflects "sequencing rather than failure".
ASD's formula divides by all applicable principles, and ASD does not say how to treat principles not yet assessed in a part-assessed domain. Our suggestion: divide by the principles you did assess, say so in the report, and show the not assessed count beside it.
You can map controls you already run, from any framework, to the actions. ASD says the mapping is a starting point, not proof the outcome is achieved. For each action, ASD's Assessment evidence guide lists where evidence may already exist in frameworks you have adopted. The list shows where to look, not which controls you need.
ASD says to start with relevant evidence you already hold, such as configuration baselines, assessment reports, audit findings, control test results and risk registers, before creating new evidence. If it still reflects your environment and covers the domain reliably, nothing more is needed.
ASD adds three cautions about existing evidence:
A control being configured or switched on does not prove it works. Look for evidence of the outcome across the domain.
Older evidence may no longer match your environment. Check it still applies.
A mapped control may meet only part of the outcome. Find and assess the rest.
ASD also expects an evidence register for each domain, which becomes your working paper for self-assessment. Implementing the Essentials shows a sample. Moving from the Essential Eight? See reusing your Essential Eight evidence.
ASD asks assessors to seek the best quality evidence that is reasonably practicable, and describes four broad levels. Our examples use IT.PRO-13.4, which asks for phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA). That is a second sign-in factor a fake login page cannot capture and reuse.
| Level | What ASD means | Example for IT.PRO-13.4 |
|---|---|---|
| Excellent | Direct proof that the action works in the live environment. | An approved test. From an untrusted location, a tester tries a password and an SMS code (which a fake login page can steal) and is blocked, as the logs show. |
| Good | Shows it working across the assets in scope, consistently and over time. | A 90-day sign-in report for every account in scope, showing the method used and any exceptions. |
| Fair | Suggests it probably works, but not directly across the domain. | A month of sign-in records for a sample of staff accounts, all using phishing-resistant MFA. |
| Poor | Shows or claims it exists, not that it works. | A written policy document saying staff must use phishing-resistant MFA, or a single screenshot of the setting switched on. |
ASD says these levels are a guide, not a rule. One strong piece may not cover a whole domain, while several good pieces can give a stronger picture. Weaker evidence may still contribute to the assessment, with its limits weighed in the rating.
Tools can gather information, find gaps and confirm that an action works. ASD recommends no specific tools. Use approved tools that fit the plan, and consider built-in features before adding products.
Record each tool's version, configuration, permissions, licensing constraints and known limitations. Check its output critically for incomplete or stale data, misconfiguration, restricted access, false alarms and missed problems. A tool that directly tests the outcome can give strong evidence. One that only reports settings and status gives supporting evidence.
If evidence shows a control was switched on but not that it keeps working, ASD says testing can add evidence. Active testing in the live environment, such as trying to run unapproved software, can give strong evidence but can also carry operational risk. ASD says it should be in the approved plan, with its target systems and limits, and run by people skilled enough to manage the risk.
ASD also maps most actions to attacker techniques, which it calls the ATT&CK mapping. It can guide what to test and what to fix first, but it never changes a rating. Our implementing guide covers using it to set priorities.
Results are reported by priority phase and domain, showing how many principles sit at each rating. ASD says every assessment report must include two views:
Shows progress across the domains, and over time.
Names the principles and actions behind each rating, and the fixes in progress.
Both views should be available to every reader, because ASD warns the summary alone may hide outstanding risk. Charts follow the same rule: ASD suggests a radar chart for boards, but says a chart must never be used on its own. Our guide for boards and executives covers reporting to the board.
ASD's own example is an organisation working towards priority phase 2. Its phase 3 domains are not assessed yet.
All phases
Governance and culture
7 fully effective,0 partially effective,0 not effective
Visibility and response
5 fully effective,4 partially effective,1 not effective
Priority phase 1
Boundary services
9 fully effective,7 partially effective,0 not effective
Identity services
9 fully effective,5 partially effective,2 not effective
Priority phase 2
Critical processes and services
12 fully effective,4 partially effective,0 not effective
Privileged environments
7 fully effective,6 partially effective,3 not effective
Priority phase 3
Business systems
13 not assessed
User devices
10 not assessed
| Priority phase | Domain | Fully effective | Partially effective | Not effective | % effective | Not assessed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All | Governance and culture | 7 | 0 | 0 | 100% | 0 |
| All | Visibility and response | 5 | 4 | 1 | 70% | 0 |
| 1 | Boundary services | 9 | 7 | 0 | 78% | 0 |
| 1 | Identity services | 9 | 5 | 2 | 72% | 0 |
| 2 | Critical processes and services | 12 | 4 | 0 | 88% | 0 |
| 2 | Privileged environments | 7 | 6 | 3 | 63% | 0 |
| 3 | Business systems | 0 | 0 | 0 | N/A | 13 |
| 3 | User devices | 0 | 0 | 0 | N/A | 10 |
The detailed view shows what drives a domain's result. Here is part of the council's view for Identity services, as our illustration, not ASD data.
| Principle | Rating | Action behind it | Fix in progress |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vulnerability managementPRO-06 | Partially effective | IT.PRO-06.2Certificate authority patches often run weeks late. | Monthly patch window for certificate services. Owner: infrastructure lead. Due in 8 weeks. |
| Regular and proven backupsPRO-10 | Not effective | IT.PRO-10.3No restore test of the directory in the defined test cycle. | Restore test booked for next month, with results to be written up. |
| Identity, credential and access managementPRO-13 | Fully effective | None. | None needed. Recheck at the next assessment. |
Common questions about Essentials assessments, answered from ASD's publications.
No: each action gets one of four ratings in each domain it applies to. ASD says Essential Eight maturity levels do not automatically convert into them. It also says to keep meeting any regulatory, contractual or other obligation to implement or report on the Essential Eight. Our guide to transitioning from the Essential Eight covers both points.
Normally, yes: one true not effective statement means a not effective rating. The assessor may rate it higher if a compensating arrangement demonstrably achieves the outcome, with the rationale and supporting evidence documented (see "Where expert judgement comes in"). An applicable fully effective statement that is not true lowers the rating only to partially effective.
Each principle takes the lowest rating of its actions and gets a score, and the domain score is their average as a percentage. "From action ratings to a domain score" works through ASD's example.
Not assessed is neutral (not checked yet, or too little evidence to judge), while not effective means the action is missing or does not achieve its outcome. ASD says the two must stay distinguishable in all reporting (see "Keep not assessed separate").
Yes, where it is relevant and current: ASD tells assessors to use existing evidence before creating new evidence. A mapping is only a starting point, though, as the "Evidence" section explains.
No, but ASD recommends a periodic independent check, especially where outside assurance is needed. A regulator or contract may also ask for one (see "Do you need an independent assessor?").
The ASD publications this page explains.
Quoted ASD material © Commonwealth of Australia 2026, licensed under CC BY 4.0.
Everything else on this page is written by Control Stack.