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ASD Essentials guide
ASD Essentials

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How the Essentials is assessed.

An Essentials assessment asks one question: is each action actually working, for the assets where it applies? This guide explains ASD's assessment process in plain English.

Reviewed 17 October 2026 · Current to ASD's Assessment process guide, published 15 October 2026

At a glance

  • You rate each action in each domain it applies to. Nothing is rated once for the whole organisation.

  • There are four ratings: not assessed, not effective, partially effective and fully effective. There is no maturity level. If a regulator, contract or other obligation still requires Essential Eight work or reporting, ASD says to keep meeting it (see keeping the Essential Eight running).

  • ASD's indicators of good practice describe each rating except not assessed. One true not effective indicator normally means a not effective rating.

  • A principle takes the lowest rating of its actions in a domain. Each domain then gets a percentage score.

  • Evidence must show the action working, not just switched on. Start with the evidence you already hold.

  • Every report needs a summary view and a detailed view, set out by priority phase and domain.

ASD's process is for assessing your own environment, in any Essentials chapter. Our examples use the enterprise IT chapter and a fictional 300-person council.

The four stages of an assessment

The approach depends on your environment's scope, size and complexity, but ASD says the same four stages always apply.

  1. Planning and preparation

    Agree the scope, bring in the people involved and write an assessment plan.

  2. Plan approval

    An appropriate authority approves the plan, including any testing, before work starts.

  3. Assessment

    Assess each domain in scope. Rate each applicable action against the assets in that domain.

  4. Aggregation and reporting

    Roll the action ratings up to principle ratings, then report the findings.

ASD's four stages of an assessment. The stage names are ASD's; the summaries are ours.

Stage 1: Planning and preparation

First, agree which domains and assets are in scope. You can assess one domain, several or all of them, and you need not follow priority phase order. Write down anything you leave out, and why.

Then bring in the people involved, such as system owners, the security team and any managed service providers. Ask third parties early for access and evidence, as ASD warns this often takes time. The process is not for assessing your suppliers. ASD says guidance on that will come later.

What the assessment plan should cover

  • The domains and assets in scope, and the principles and actions that apply to each.
  • How each action will be assessed, including any tools or testing.
  • The evidence you already hold, as the starting point.
  • Access to systems, data, accounts, documents, people and sites.
  • How sampling will work, if used.
  • How evidence will be collected, protected, and kept or disposed of.
  • Where the report will be written, stored and tracked.
  • The timeframe, milestones and key dependencies.

ASD's list, in our words.

Stage 2: Plan approval

An appropriate authority in the organisation approves the plan, including any testing or tools, before work starts, and again if it changes materially. Record anything that limits the assessment, such as access you could not get, so the report can include it.

Stages 3 and 4: assess, then report

The assessor rates each applicable action in each domain in scope, recording the evidence relied on and, below fully effective, the specific gaps. If the plan allows sampling, they note which assets they checked and why. Then they roll the ratings up and report, as the scoring and reporting sections explain.

Do you need an independent assessor?

No. ASD does not require an independent assessor, but says you may choose one where proportionate and affordable. It does recommend periodic independent assessment in your reassessment cycle, particularly where external assurance is required. ASD's process also does not replace any regulatory or compliance requirements, so check whether a regulator or contract asks for one.

The three layers behind each rating

ASD says assessors "do not assess controls in isolation." Each rating joins three layers: the principle is the outcome, the action is what you do, and the domain sets which assets get checked. Our overview explains how principles, actions and domains fit together.

PrincipleWhat outcome?Principles describe the cyber security outcomes an organisation should achieve.

PRO-06Vulnerability management

Vulnerabilities in systems (infrastructure, operating systems, applications and data) are identified, documented, validated and prioritised for remediation or mitigation in a timely manner, with all remediation and mitigation actions verified for effectiveness.

ActionWhat needs to be done?Actions describe what needs to be done to achieve those outcomes.

IT.PRO-06.2

Apply security patches or updates within defined risk-based timeframes or automatically where operational impact is low.

DomainWhere does it apply?Domains describe the business functions and assets to which the actions apply.

IT.PRO-06.2 applies in 6 domains:

  • Boundary services
  • Identity services
  • Critical processes and services
  • Privileged environments
  • Business systems
  • User devices
The three layers for one action, IT.PRO-06.2: its principle, the action itself and the domains it applies in. The sentence that describes each layer, the principle statement and the action are quoted as published by ASD.

ASD's three questions for assessing an action, quoted

  1. What outcome does the principle require for this domain?
  2. Does the action achieve that outcome for the assets in this domain?
  3. Is there sufficient evidence that the action is operating effectively across the domain?

ASD, Assessment process guide

Rating an action

Each action gets one of four ratings in each domain it applies to. The action rating asks whether the outcome is achieved across the assets in scope, not whether a specific control is in place.

Not assessed

Not checked yet, or not enough evidence to judge. It is neutral, not a fail.

  1. Not effective

    Missing, or in place but not delivering the outcome for the assets in scope.

  2. Partially effective

    A real security benefit, but gaps in coverage, consistency or enforcement remain. A plan, or work just started, does not count.

  3. Fully effective

    Delivers the outcome across the whole domain, and the evidence shows it.

ASD's four ratings. Not assessed stands apart because it is neutral. The one-line meanings are ours.
ASD's exact definitions of the four ratings

The action rating scale, quoted

Not assessed
The action has not yet been assessed against the domain, or there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the intended security outcome is being achieved. This is a neutral rating that may reflect assessment scope, sequencing or a limitation encountered during the assessment. This rating must remain distinguishable from not effective in all reporting.
Not effective
The action is absent or implemented in a way that does not achieve the intended security outcome for the assets in scope. An action may be present in some form and still be rated not effective if it delivers no meaningful security benefit.
Partially effective
The action is in place and achieves the intended security outcome in part, but gaps in coverage, consistency or enforcement, limit its effectiveness across the domain. Partial activity alone, such as work commencing or a plan existing, is not partial effectiveness.
Fully effective
The action is implemented in a way the demonstrably achieves the intended security outcome across the domain and is supported by sufficient evidence.

ASD, Assessment process guide, The action rating scale

Indicators of good practice

For every action, ASD's Assessment evidence guide for enterprise IT describes what each rating except not assessed looks like. These short statements are the indicators of good practice, or IGPs. There are 529 across 58 actions, each listed on our enterprise IT page.

ASD calls the indicators optional, and says:

The IGPs do not replace expert judgement, nor are they intended to serve as a checklist.

ASD, Assessment evidence guide for enterprise IT

If the assessor uses the indicators, ASD's rule turns them into a rating in three checks, in order.

  1. Is any not effective statement true?

    Yes: the action is not effective. No: go to step 2.

  2. Is any partially effective statement true, or an applicable fully effective one not true?

    Yes: the action is partially effective. No: go to step 3.

  3. Every applicable fully effective statement is true.

    The action is fully effective.

ASD's rule for rating an action from its indicators, in our words. ASD sums it up as rating each action "on the lowest level reached". Expert judgement can support a different rating, as the next part explains.

ASD does not say when a statement is not applicable. Our suggestion: set one aside only when the situation it describes does not arise in the domain, and record why. For example, FE-3 in the worked example below applies only where something prevents timely patching.

ASD's exact rating rule

ASD's rating rule for the indicators, quoted

  • If any not effective statement is true, the action is rated not effective.
  • If all applicable fully effective statements are true, and no partially effective or not effective statement is true, the action is rated fully effective.
  • In all other cases, including where some fully effective statements are true and others are not, the action is rated partially effective.

ASD, Assessment evidence guide for enterprise IT

Worked example: rating one action

ASD's own example is patching in Identity services. An attacker who takes over a domain controller, federation service or certificate authority can gain broad access. The assessor checks patching for these assets, not across the whole organisation, using ASD's indicators for IT.PRO-06.2 under PRO-06 Vulnerability management.

The action: Apply security patches or updates within defined risk-based timeframes or automatically where operational impact is low.

Not effective

  • NE-1No defined patching timeframes exist for applicable assets.
  • NE-2Patches are not applied or are applied on an ad hoc basis with no tracking.

Partially effective

  • PE-1Expected patching timeframes are defined by the organisation but are not consistently met.
  • PE-2Patches are applied but compensating controls are not documented where operational constraints prevent timely patching.
  • PE-3Patching coverage metrics exist but show significant gaps.

Fully effective

  • FE-1Risk-based patching timeframes defined by the organisation are in place and consistently met.
  • FE-2Patching is prioritised based on vulnerability severity, exposure and exploit availability.
  • FE-3Where operational constraints prevent timely patching, compensating controls are documented and approved.
  • FE-4Patching coverage metrics account for all applicable assets, with any exclusions identified and formally risk accepted.
  • FE-5Automatic patching of assets is applied where available and the organisation has determined operational impact is low.

ASD, Assessment evidence guide for enterprise IT, IT.PRO-06.2

Where expert judgement comes in

The indicators cannot foresee every setup, so the assessor stays responsible for the rating. ASD says to assess the outcome achieved: a setup that differs from the indicators is still fully effective if the evidence shows it achieves the outcome.

A single not effective statement is normally decisive, with one exception:

A material failure represented by a not effective statement will normally result in a not effective rating. Where a compensating arrangement demonstrably achieves the action’s intended outcome, the assessor may assign a higher rating if the rationale and supporting evidence are documented.

ASD, Assessment process guide

A compensating arrangement is a different measure that still delivers the outcome. For example, a system that cannot be patched might be cut off so attackers cannot reach it. When departing from the indicators, ASD says to record the outcome achieved, the evidence relied on and any compensating arrangements.

Assessing a domain

Each domain is assessed on its own, against its own assets and risks, so the same action can earn a different rating in each domain. A good result in one domain does not carry across to another.

Scope the domain first

Where possible, the assessor starts from the scope you set when implementing and checks it is accurate, complete and current. An incomplete scope can give misleading results, so big gaps are recorded as findings. An asset that supports more than one domain is included in each and assessed separately in each. Our scoping guide covers recording your scope and assets in more than one domain.

Four things to check for each action

For each action that applies in the domain, ASD asks the assessor to check four things, which it calls the assessment dimensions.

Coverage

Is the action applied to every relevant asset in the domain?

Our example gap: Scanning reaches every server except those on one isolated network segment.

Consistency

Is it applied the same way across those assets?

Our example gap: Head office laptops get patches within days. Depot laptops wait until someone remembers.

Currency

Is the evidence recent enough to show how things work today?

Our example gap: The last restore test was 18 months ago, before the backup system changed.

Evidence quality

Is the evidence reliable and relevant enough to show the outcome?

Our example gap: A policy saying backups are tested is weak. Signed restore test records are much stronger.

Gaps in coverage or consistency may stop an action reaching fully effective. For a partially effective rating, the assessor writes the gaps down so fixes can be planned.

When is a domain addressed?

A domain is considered to be addressed when all applicable actions are operating as intended and are rated as fully effective.

ASD, Assessment process guide

From action ratings to a domain score

Ratings roll up in two steps: action ratings become principle ratings, then principle ratings become a percentage for the domain, which we call the domain score. ASD's example summary table labels the same figure "% effective".

One domain, four principles

Illustration, not ASD data

Worked example: action ratings rolled up to principle ratings and scores for one domain
Principle1. Action ratings2. Lowest rating3. Score
Principle A
  • Fully effective
  • Fully effective
Fully effective1
Principle B
  • Fully effective
  • Fully effective
  • Fully effective
Fully effective1
Principle C
  • Fully effective
  • Partially effective
Partially effective0.5
Principle D
  • Fully effective
  • Not effective
  • Partially effective
Not effective0

4. Domain score

(1 + 1 + 0.5 + 0) ÷ 4 principles = 2.5 of 4, which is

62.5%

Not assessed has no score. ASD reports it in its own column, and a domain with nothing assessed shows N/A, not 0%.

How action ratings roll up to a domain score, for a made-up domain with four principles. Each principle takes its lowest action rating, then the scores are added and divided by the number of principles.

Step 1: the weakest link sets the principle rating

Within a domain, a principle takes the lowest rating of its applicable actions. ASD calls this the weakest link rule, because one material gap can limit the whole principle.

Step 2: score the principles

Each principle rating gets a score: 0 for not effective, 0.5 for partially effective and 1 for fully effective. Add up the scores, then divide by the number of applicable principles in the domain.

ASD's example: Visibility and response

5 fully effective × 1 = 5.
4 partially effective × 0.5 = 2.
1 not effective × 0 = 0.

Total 7, divided by 10 principles = 70%.

Keep not assessed separate

Use not assessed when the evidence is too thin to tell whether the outcome is achieved, and record why. Use not effective when the evidence shows the outcome is not achieved. Not assessed has no score, and ASD says it "must remain distinguishable from not effective in all reporting."

A principle can be partially or fully effective only once all its applicable actions in the domain are assessed. One not effective action makes it not effective straight away. Otherwise, while any of its actions is still not assessed, so is the principle. A domain you have not assessed yet is recorded as not assessed across all its applicable principles, which ASD says reflects "sequencing rather than failure".

ASD's formula divides by all applicable principles, and ASD does not say how to treat principles not yet assessed in a part-assessed domain. Our suggestion: divide by the principles you did assess, say so in the report, and show the not assessed count beside it.

Evidence

Start with the evidence you already hold

You can map controls you already run, from any framework, to the actions. ASD says the mapping is a starting point, not proof the outcome is achieved. For each action, ASD's Assessment evidence guide lists where evidence may already exist in frameworks you have adopted. The list shows where to look, not which controls you need.

ASD says to start with relevant evidence you already hold, such as configuration baselines, assessment reports, audit findings, control test results and risk registers, before creating new evidence. If it still reflects your environment and covers the domain reliably, nothing more is needed.

ASD adds three cautions about existing evidence:

Deployment is not effectiveness.

A control being configured or switched on does not prove it works. Look for evidence of the outcome across the domain.

Evidence must be current.

Older evidence may no longer match your environment. Check it still applies.

Controls may only partially satisfy an action.

A mapped control may meet only part of the outcome. Find and assess the rest.

ASD also expects an evidence register for each domain, which becomes your working paper for self-assessment. Implementing the Essentials shows a sample. Moving from the Essential Eight? See reusing your Essential Eight evidence.

What makes evidence good

ASD asks assessors to seek the best quality evidence that is reasonably practicable, and describes four broad levels. Our examples use IT.PRO-13.4, which asks for phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA). That is a second sign-in factor a fake login page cannot capture and reuse.

ASD's four levels of evidence quality, in our words. The examples are ours, not ASD's.
LevelWhat ASD meansExample for IT.PRO-13.4
ExcellentDirect proof that the action works in the live environment.An approved test. From an untrusted location, a tester tries a password and an SMS code (which a fake login page can steal) and is blocked, as the logs show.
GoodShows it working across the assets in scope, consistently and over time.A 90-day sign-in report for every account in scope, showing the method used and any exceptions.
FairSuggests it probably works, but not directly across the domain.A month of sign-in records for a sample of staff accounts, all using phishing-resistant MFA.
PoorShows or claims it exists, not that it works.A written policy document saying staff must use phishing-resistant MFA, or a single screenshot of the setting switched on.

ASD says these levels are a guide, not a rule. One strong piece may not cover a whole domain, while several good pieces can give a stronger picture. Weaker evidence may still contribute to the assessment, with its limits weighed in the rating.

Tools and testing

Tools can gather information, find gaps and confirm that an action works. ASD recommends no specific tools. Use approved tools that fit the plan, and consider built-in features before adding products.

Record each tool's version, configuration, permissions, licensing constraints and known limitations. Check its output critically for incomplete or stale data, misconfiguration, restricted access, false alarms and missed problems. A tool that directly tests the outcome can give strong evidence. One that only reports settings and status gives supporting evidence.

Simulations and active testing

If evidence shows a control was switched on but not that it keeps working, ASD says testing can add evidence. Active testing in the live environment, such as trying to run unapproved software, can give strong evidence but can also carry operational risk. ASD says it should be in the approved plan, with its target systems and limits, and run by people skilled enough to manage the risk.

ASD also maps most actions to attacker techniques, which it calls the ATT&CK mapping. It can guide what to test and what to fix first, but it never changes a rating. Our implementing guide covers using it to set priorities.

Reporting the results

Results are reported by priority phase and domain, showing how many principles sit at each rating. ASD says every assessment report must include two views:

The summary view

Shows progress across the domains, and over time.

The detailed view

Names the principles and actions behind each rating, and the fixes in progress.

Both views should be available to every reader, because ASD warns the summary alone may hide outstanding risk. Charts follow the same rule: ASD suggests a radar chart for boards, but says a chart must never be used on its own. Our guide for boards and executives covers reporting to the board.

What a summary view looks like

ASD's own example is an organisation working towards priority phase 2. Its phase 3 domains are not assessed yet.

All phases

  • Governance and culture

    100% effective

    7 fully effective,0 partially effective,0 not effective

  • Visibility and response

    70% effective

    5 fully effective,4 partially effective,1 not effective

Priority phase 1

  • Boundary services

    78% effective

    9 fully effective,7 partially effective,0 not effective

  • Identity services

    72% effective

    9 fully effective,5 partially effective,2 not effective

Priority phase 2

  • Critical processes and services

    88% effective

    12 fully effective,4 partially effective,0 not effective

  • Privileged environments

    63% effective

    7 fully effective,6 partially effective,3 not effective

Priority phase 3

  • Business systems

    N/A, not assessed

    13 not assessed

  • User devices

    N/A, not assessed

    10 not assessed

ASD's Table 2: Example summary assessment results, drawn as bars. The counts are principles at each rating. Figures are quoted exactly from the Assessment process guide. A domain not assessed gets an empty track, not a 0% bar.
ASD's Table 2 as a table
ASD's Table 2: Example summary assessment results. Figures quoted exactly from the Assessment process guide.
Priority
phase
DomainFully
effective
Partially
effective
Not
effective
%
effective
Not
assessed
AllGovernance and culture700100%0
AllVisibility and response54170%0
1Boundary services97078%0
1Identity services95272%0
2Critical processes and services124088%0
2Privileged environments76363%0
3Business systems000N/A13
3User devices000N/A10

What a detailed view adds

The detailed view shows what drives a domain's result. Here is part of the council's view for Identity services, as our illustration, not ASD data.

Illustration: part of a detailed view for one domain, for a fictional council.
PrincipleRatingAction behind itFix in progress
Vulnerability managementPRO-06Partially effectiveIT.PRO-06.2Certificate authority patches often run weeks late.Monthly patch window for certificate services. Owner: infrastructure lead. Due in 8 weeks.
Regular and proven backupsPRO-10Not effectiveIT.PRO-10.3No restore test of the directory in the defined test cycle.Restore test booked for next month, with results to be written up.
Identity, credential and access managementPRO-13Fully effectiveNone.None needed. Recheck at the next assessment.

Frequently asked questions

Common questions about Essentials assessments, answered from ASD's publications.

Is there a maturity level in the ASD Essentials?

No: each action gets one of four ratings in each domain it applies to. ASD says Essential Eight maturity levels do not automatically convert into them. It also says to keep meeting any regulatory, contractual or other obligation to implement or report on the Essential Eight. Our guide to transitioning from the Essential Eight covers both points.

Does one failing indicator fail the whole action?

Normally, yes: one true not effective statement means a not effective rating. The assessor may rate it higher if a compensating arrangement demonstrably achieves the outcome, with the rationale and supporting evidence documented (see "Where expert judgement comes in"). An applicable fully effective statement that is not true lowers the rating only to partially effective.

How is a domain score calculated?

Each principle takes the lowest rating of its actions and gets a score, and the domain score is their average as a percentage. "From action ratings to a domain score" works through ASD's example.

What is the difference between not assessed and not effective?

Not assessed is neutral (not checked yet, or too little evidence to judge), while not effective means the action is missing or does not achieve its outcome. ASD says the two must stay distinguishable in all reporting (see "Keep not assessed separate").

Can we reuse evidence we already have from other frameworks or audits?

Yes, where it is relevant and current: ASD tells assessors to use existing evidence before creating new evidence. A mapping is only a starting point, though, as the "Evidence" section explains.

Do we need an independent assessor?

No, but ASD recommends a periodic independent check, especially where outside assurance is needed. A regulator or contract may also ask for one (see "Do you need an independent assessor?").

Quoted ASD material © Commonwealth of Australia 2026, licensed under CC BY 4.0.

Everything else on this page is written by Control Stack.