ASD ISM 1633 Determine system boundary, criticality and security objectives
What it says
System owners, in consultation with each system's authorising officer, determine the system boundary, business criticality, and security and resilience objectives for each system based on an assessment of the impact if it were to be compromised or attacked.
Quoted as published. Everything else on this page is written by Control Stack.
In plain English
System owners, consulting each authorising officer, determine each system's boundary, business criticality, and security and resilience objectives from the assessed impact of compromise or attack.
System owners must determine four things for each system, in consultation with its authorising officer (the senior executive who decides whether a system may operate) and based on an assessment of the impact if it were compromised or attacked:
- System boundary: what the system includes and where it stops
- Business criticality: how much the organisation's work depends on it
- Security objectives: the protection its data and functions need
- Resilience objectives: the disruption it must withstand and recover from
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Why it matters
These decisions steer everything after them. A boundary that leaves out a connected service can leave it uncontrolled, and criticality or objectives not tied to real impact mean controls are chosen, and security risk later accepted, for the wrong level of impact.
How to implement
Assess the impact if the system were compromised or attacked.
Cover data being exposed or changed and the system being unavailable, and record, on the organisation's own impact scale, the effect on services, data and people. Do this when design starts, or now for a system already running.
Draw the system boundary using the assessed impact.
List the applications, operating systems, infrastructure, data stores and suppliers whose compromise would cause that impact, and every connection crossing the boundary. For a bought service, put your data, configuration and connections inside, and note the provider's part using the shared responsibility model (ISM-1569).
Rate business criticality from the assessed impact.
Use the organisation's own rating scale, because the control sets none, and rely on the assessment rather than on who uses the system or what it cost. Backup decisions later depend on this rating (ISM-1511).
Write security and resilience objectives for this system.
State what must stay confidential, correct and available, and how much outage and data loss it can tolerate, so you can later tell whether they are met. The organisation sets the values from the impact assessment, because the control sets none.
Keep it running
Reassess when the system's data, users, connections or hosting change, after a major incident involving it, or when a new threat changes the likely impact. Changed objectives then flow into control selection (ISM-1634).
Evidence and audit
- Check 1 of 4What an auditor asks for
Ask for
The register of systems (ISM-1966), an independent list such as cloud billing records or a network discovery scan, and the recorded decisions for each system.
Look at
Whether any system is missing its boundary, business criticality, security objectives or resilience objectives.
Good evidence
Every system on the register and the independent list has a recorded boundary, business criticality, security objectives and resilience objectives.
- Check 2 of 4What an auditor asks for
Ask for
The recorded boundary for a sampled system, with a discovery scan, network diagram or cloud inventory for the same system.
Look at
Whether any component or connection found falls outside the boundary without being recorded, and whether the boundary matches the system security plan.
Good evidence
Every component and connection found is inside the recorded boundary or listed as crossing it, and the boundary matches the system security plan (ISM-0041).
- Check 3 of 4What an auditor asks for
Ask for
The impact assessment behind a sampled system's decisions, and the objectives of a second system with a different impact.
Look at
Whether the assessment states the impact if the system were compromised or attacked, whether the boundary, rating and objectives follow from it, and whether the objectives differ between the two systems.
Good evidence
The assessment states the impact if the system were compromised or attacked, the boundary, business criticality and each objective trace to it, and the two systems' objectives differ where their impact differs.
- Check 4 of 4What an auditor asks for
Ask for
The record of consultation with the authorising officer for a sampled system, and the officer's own account of it.
Look at
What the officer was shown, when, and how the response was handled.
Good evidence
A dated record, which the officer confirms, shows the authorising officer was consulted on the boundary, business criticality and objectives before they were finalised, and what the response was.
Mappings
Closest match in ASD Essentials for enterprise IT: IT.IDE-01.2, Keep current records of infrastructure, software, identities, credentials and data, which partially overlaps with this control.
ISO/IEC 27001: 1 mapping
This control is required by A.5.30.
ISM-1633 requires defining system boundaries, criticality and security objectives based on impact if compromised. This supports ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 5.30 because ICT continuity objectives and readiness planning depend on understanding which systems are critical and what availability/recovery objectives are required. Annex A 5.30 focuses on continuity planning and testing, whereas ISM-1633 establishes the business-driven objectives that continuity requirements should reflect.
ASD Essentials for enterprise IT: 1 mapping
- IT.IDE-01.2Keep current records of infrastructure, software, identities, credentials and dataPartially overlaps
This control partially overlaps IT.IDE-01.2.
IT.IDE-01.2 requires current records of infrastructure, operating systems, applications, identities, credentials and data assets; ISM-1633 adds system context, with system owners determining each system's boundary, business criticality, and security and resilience objectives.
Mappings show how controls relate across frameworks. They do not imply full equivalence or certification.




