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System access
ASD ISMISM-0409

ASD ISM 0409 Restricting foreign national access to AUSTEO and REL systems

What it says

Foreign nationals, including seconded foreign nationals, do not have access to systems that process, store or communicate AUSTEO or REL data unless effective security controls are in place to ensure such data is not accessible to them.

Quoted as published. Everything else on this page is written by Control Stack.

In plain English

On SECRET and TOP SECRET systems handling AUSTEO or REL data, foreign nationals, seconded ones included, have no access unless effective controls keep that data from them.

Foreign nationals, including seconded foreign nationals, must not have access to systems that process, store or communicate AUSTEO or REL data, unless effective security controls keep that data out of their reach. AUSTEO means Australian Eyes Only. REL means Releasable To the countries its marking names, whose nationals may access it. A foreign national is anyone who is not an Australian citizen, such as a permanent resident. Seconded means a foreign government representative on exchange or long-term posting. The ISM applies this control to SECRET and TOP SECRET systems only.

Why it matters

AUSTEO and REL markings withhold data from foreign nationals, or from all but named countries, because of its sensitivity. A foreign national on a system holding such data could otherwise reach it, so their access depends on controls that keep it from them.

How to implement

  1. Find where AUSTEO and REL data is processed, stored or communicated.

    For each SECRET and TOP SECRET system, record whether it handles either and where, such as file shares, email, collaboration sites, databases, print queues and backups. Search existing content for the markings to find copies held outside those places.

  2. Identify every foreign national with access, seconded staff included.

    ISM-0420 requires them to be identified by specific nationality. Match the system's user list to personnel, contractor and security clearance records. For supplier or support staff, confirm each person's citizenship before they get access, and give none where it cannot be confirmed.

  3. Remove their access, or put effective controls in place before granting it.

    Keep AUSTEO data, and REL data not released to their country, where their accounts cannot reach it, such as separate repositories or access groups that exclude them. Cover every path, including search, shared mailboxes, email distribution lists (ISM-0269), printing and backups. Give them no privileged access (ISM-0446).

  4. Test the controls before granting access.

    With a test account holding the same groups and attributes as the foreign national, try to open, search for and print AUSTEO data and REL data not released to their country, including through shared mailboxes. Record the results, and grant access only once every attempt fails.

Keep it running

Retest the controls whenever a foreign national is given access or changes role, AUSTEO or REL data moves to a new location, or the system's search, sharing or storage changes. Keep citizenship records current, since they decide who this control covers.

Evidence and audit

  1. Check 1 of 3What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    The system's user list, with HR, contractor and security clearance records showing each user's citizenship.

    Look at

    Whether every user who is not an Australian citizen is identified as a foreign national, including seconded foreign nationals and supplier staff.

    Good evidence

    Every user who is not an Australian citizen, including seconded foreign nationals and supplier staff, is identified as a foreign national, and each one either has no access or gained it only after tested controls kept from them AUSTEO data and REL data not released to their country.

  2. Check 2 of 3What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    A sampled foreign national's own effective permissions, including direct shares and mailbox delegations, and a test with a test account holding the same groups and attributes as that person, trying to open, search for and print AUSTEO data and REL data not released to their country.

    Look at

    Whether any permission or attempt reaches the data or its content, including through search results, shared mailboxes and distribution lists.

    Good evidence

    The person's own account holds no grant or delegation that reaches AUSTEO data or REL data not released to their country, and every test attempt to reach that data fails by every path tested.

  3. Check 3 of 3What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    A search of the system's storage for AUSTEO and REL markings, compared with the locations the controls protect.

    Look at

    Whether a foreign national can reach any marked item, other than REL items released to their own country.

    Good evidence

    Every item marked AUSTEO or REL is in a location the controls protect, and no foreign national can reach any of them except REL items released to their own country.

Mappings

Closest match in ISO/IEC 27001: A.5.15, Access control, which this control depends on.

ISO 27001

ISO/IEC 27001: 3 mappings

  • A.5.15Access controlDepends on
  • A.5.18Access rightsDepends on

Mappings show how controls relate across frameworks. They do not imply full equivalence or certification.