ASD ISM 2131 Quarterly certificate template reviews to remediate misconfigurations
What it says
Certificate templates are reviewed at least every three months to identify and remediate misconfigurations that could enable privilege escalation or unauthorised certificate enrolment.
Quoted as published. Everything else on this page is written by Control Stack.
What it means
In plain EnglishCheck every certificate template at least quarterly for settings that would let someone gain higher privileges or request certificates they should not have, and fix what you find.
A certificate template is the set of rules a certificate authority uses when it issues a certificate: who is allowed to request one, what the certificate can be used for, whether the requester can choose the name that goes in it, and whether a manager has to approve it. Templates tend to be created once and then forgotten, while the people, groups and systems around them change. This control asks you to open up every template at least once every three months and look specifically for two kinds of problem. The first is a setting that could enable privilege escalation, for example a template that lets an ordinary user obtain a certificate that works for logon or authentication as a more powerful account. The second is a setting that allows unauthorised certificate enrolment, for example enrol permissions granted to a broad group, or an approval step that has been switched off. Anything you find has to be remediated, not just noted. It matters because a badly configured template is a quiet, durable path for an attacker who already has a foothold. Instead of cracking passwords, they simply request a certificate the template was never meant to give them and then use it to authenticate as someone else. Because the certificate is valid and issued by your own authority, this can look entirely legitimate to the systems that trust it. A regular review is how you catch that drift before someone else does.
Free. Save your status, tasks and notes.
Why it matters
If templates are not reviewed on a regular cycle, misconfigurations accumulate unnoticed. An attacker with low-privileged access could use an over-permissive template to enrol for a certificate that authenticates them as a privileged account, giving them a persistent, hard-to-detect route to domain or system compromise. Unauthorised enrolment can also produce valid certificates for people or devices that should never have received them, undermining every service that trusts the certificate authority. The longer the gap between reviews, the longer such a path stays open.
How to implement
The certificate services owner sets a recurring review task, no more than three months apart, in the team's work calendar or ticketing system, and assigns a named reviewer and an approver for each cycle.
The reviewer exports the full list of certificate templates and their settings from each certificate authority (using the CA management console or command-line tooling) so every template is covered and the export can be kept as a record.
The reviewer works through a fixed checklist per template covering enrol and auto-enrol permissions, who can edit the template, allowed purposes and extended key usages (especially authentication), whether the requester can supply the subject name, and whether approval is required, marking each item as acceptable or a finding.
For each finding, the certificate services team applies the fix (tightening permissions, removing an unsafe usage, requiring approval, or unpublishing an unneeded template) through normal change control and records the before and after settings.
At the start of each review, the reviewer re-checks that all findings from the previous cycle were remediated and confirms any templates created or changed since then are included in the current cycle.
Keep it running
Treat the review as a recurring calendar task owned by the certificate or identity team, scheduled so that no more than three months pass between completed reviews. Keep a current inventory of templates so the review has a known scope and nothing is skipped.
For each template, the reviewer checks who holds enrol and auto-enrol permissions, who can modify the template itself, which purposes and extended key usages it allows (particularly anything usable for authentication), whether requesters can supply their own subject name, whether manager or CA approval is required, and whether the template is still needed at all. Findings are recorded and either fixed on the spot or raised as a change with a due date. Fixes are verified at the following review.
Templates that are unused should be considered for removal, since they still carry risk while published. Any new template or change to an existing one made between reviews should be examined at the next review so the cycle stays complete.
Evidence and audit
- Check 1 of 5What an auditor asks for
Ask for
Ask for the schedule or ticket history showing when certificate template reviews were carried out over the last year.
Look at
Check the dates of completed reviews and the gaps between them.
Good evidence
Reviews are completed with no more than three months between them, and each has a named reviewer and a completion date.
- Check 2 of 5What an auditor asks for
Ask for
Ask for the template inventory or export used as the scope of the most recent review.
Look at
Compare it with the templates currently published on the certificate authority.
Good evidence
Every template on the CA appears in the review scope, including recently added ones.
- Check 3 of 5What an auditor asks for
Ask for
Ask for the checklist or working notes from a recent review.
Look at
Confirm it examines enrol permissions, template modification rights, allowed purposes, subject name supply and approval settings for each template.
Good evidence
Each template has a recorded assessment against those settings, with findings clearly marked.
- Check 4 of 5What an auditor asks for
Ask for
Ask for the list of findings raised in the last two reviews and the changes made in response.
Look at
Trace each finding to a change record or configuration change that fixed it.
Good evidence
Every finding has a documented fix, a date and someone who verified it, rather than being left open.
- Check 5 of 5What an auditor asks for
Ask for
Ask to see the current settings of one or two templates that were flagged in a previous review.
Look at
Check the live configuration matches the remediated state described in the review record.
Good evidence
The live template reflects the fix, showing the review actually changed the configuration.
Mappings
Closest match in ISO/IEC 27001: A.8.9, Configuration management for secure IT systems, which this control partially meets.
ISO/IEC 27001: 3 mappings
This control partially meets A.8.9.
ISM-2131 requires certificate templates to be reviewed at least quarterly to identify and remediate misconfigurations that could enable privilege escalation or unauthorised certificate enrolment. This directly fits within ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 8.9 because certificate template settings are a security-relevant configuration that should be established, monitored and reviewed. Annex A 8.9 is broader (covers configurations across hardware, software, services and networks), while ISM-2131 is a specific, time-bound review requirement focused on AD CS template misconfiguration risks.
This control partially overlaps A.8.8.
ISM-2131 requires certificate templates to be reviewed at least quarterly to find and fix misconfigurations that could allow privilege escalation or unauthorised enrolment. This overlaps with ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 8.8 because certificate template misconfigurations are a common class of technical vulnerability that organisations should evaluate for exposure and treat. Annex A 8.8 is broader and vulnerability-driven (feeds, assessment, treatment) and is not specifically about certificate template governance or a mandated three‑monthly review cadence.
This control supports A.5.18.
ISM-2131 requires routine review and remediation of certificate template settings to prevent unauthorised certificate enrolment and escalation paths created through misconfiguration. This supports ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 5.18 because tightening template security descriptors, enrolment permissions and EKU/issuance controls helps ensure access rights to certificate-based capabilities are correctly provisioned and reviewed. Annex A 5.18 is broader across all information assets and access rights lifecycles, while ISM-2131 is a technical control focused on AD CS template configuration integrity.
Mappings show how controls relate across frameworks. They do not imply full equivalence or certification.




