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Cyber security incidents
ASD ISMISM-1213

ASD ISM 1213 Enhanced monitoring after intrusion remediation until eradication is confirmed

What it says

Following intrusion remediation activities, enhanced monitoring is conducted until there is sufficient evidence-based confidence that malicious actors have been eradicated from a system and have not re-established access.

Quoted as published. Everything else on this page is written by Control Stack.

What it means

In plain English

After intrusion remediation activities, conduct enhanced monitoring until sufficient evidence-based confidence exists that malicious actors have been eradicated and have not re-established access.

After intrusion remediation activities, enhanced monitoring must run until there is sufficient evidence-based confidence of two things: malicious actors have been eradicated from a system, and they have not re-established access. Enhanced monitoring means watching the system more closely than normal, and the control leaves the methods to the organisation. The end point is evidence, not a date, and no fixed period is set. The organisation decides what is sufficient, based on what its investigation and monitoring show.

Why it matters

Remediation can miss a way in or a hidden foothold, and a malicious actor may try to return. Closer monitoring gives a better chance of detecting this, and ending it only on evidence avoids declaring a system clean simply because time has passed.

How to implement

  1. Define the enhanced monitoring before remediation finishes.

    Add to normal monitoring: more event log sources, detection rules for the indicators and tools the investigation found, and faster alert review by named people. Have it running from the moment remediation ends.

  2. Agree what evidence will end the monitoring.

    Use forensic findings: how the actor got in and how far they reached; access paths and persistence closed; systems rebuilt, restored from known-good backups or shown to be trustworthy; the accounts, credentials, certificates, keys and trust relationships involved changed, revoked or removed; and threat hunting finding no new signs.

  3. Watch the ways an actor could return.

    Alert on the original entry point, use of old credentials, new accounts or privileges, new remote access and contact with known malicious infrastructure. For a bought service, use its audit logs. If they are too limited, record the gap and count it against your confidence.

  4. Hunt for signs of return while monitoring runs.

    Search logs and systems for the actor's tools, indicators and techniques, because alerts only catch what rules describe. Routine threat hunting (ISM-2153) does not replace a hunt aimed at this intrusion.

  5. Record the evidence, then decide whether monitoring can end.

    Set the evidence against what was agreed, covering both eradication and no re-established access, and note who decided and when. If new signs appear, keep monitoring and reopen remediation. Return to normal monitoring only once the evidence supports it.

Keep it running

Review progress against the agreed evidence at intervals the organisation sets, as the control sets none. Any new sign of the actor, or a newly found access path, reopens remediation and restarts the assessment.

Evidence and audit

  1. Check 1 of 4What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    Monitoring configuration and alert records from before and after remediation of a recent intrusion, including log sources, detection rules and alert queues.

    Look at

    What was added to normal monitoring, when it started, whether it covers the indicators and access paths the investigation found, and whether a real or test event shows the added rules reaching a reviewer.

    Good evidence

    Monitoring exceeds the normal baseline from the end of remediation with no gap, covers those indicators and access paths, and a real or test event shows the added rules reaching a reviewer.

  2. Check 2 of 4What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    The record of the decision to end enhanced monitoring, with the evidence behind it.

    Look at

    Whether the evidence supports both eradication and no re-established access, and whether evidence or a date set the end.

    Good evidence

    The decision cites evidence for both eradication from the system and no re-established access, and monitoring did not end before that decision or simply because a set period had passed.

  3. Check 3 of 4What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    An independent search of event logs since remediation for the intrusion's indicators, old credentials and original access path, run by someone other than the monitoring reviewers.

    Look at

    Whether the search finds anything not assessed before monitoring ended, and whether alerts raised during the period were reviewed.

    Good evidence

    Alerts raised during the period have recorded reviews, and the search finds no indicator, credential use or access left unassessed when monitoring ended.

  4. Check 4 of 4What an auditor asks for

    Ask for

    Change records for emergency credential resets and system rebuilds, compared with the cyber security incident register and the enhanced monitoring records.

    Look at

    Whether any intrusion that was remediated has no enhanced monitoring and, if there have been no intrusions, how the intrusion procedure would start and end it.

    Good evidence

    Every remediated intrusion, including any the register missed, has enhanced monitoring records. If there have been none, the procedure starts enhanced monitoring when remediation ends and ends it only on evidence of both eradication and no re-established access.

Mappings

Closest match in ISO/IEC 27001: A.5.26, Response to information security incidents, which this control partially meets.

ISO 27001

ISO/IEC 27001: 3 mappings

  • A.8.15LoggingPartially meets
  • A.8.16Monitoring activitiesPartially meets
Essential Eight

ASD Essential Eight: 1 mapping

Mappings show how controls relate across frameworks. They do not imply full equivalence or certification.