Essential Eight RM-ML3.4 Untrusted publisher macros cannot be enabled via Message Bar or Backstage View
What it says
Microsoft Office macros digitally signed by an untrusted publisher cannot be enabled via the Message Bar or Backstage View.
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What it means
In plain EnglishBlock untrusted Microsoft Office macros from being enabled using standard interface warnings.
This control is about making sure that untrusted macros in Microsoft Office can't be turned on through the usual ways users interact with the software. Macros can be tiny programs inside Office documents, which, if untrusted, might run harmful commands that could steal data or damage systems. Without this control, your organisation is at risk of letting harmful code run freely through seemingly harmless documents.
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Why it matters
Allowing macros from untrusted publishers to be enabled can lead to malicious code execution via Office documents, causing compromise or data loss.
How to implement
IT team: Identify all computers that have Microsoft Office installations.
Ensure the security settings prevent enabling untrusted macros from the Message Bar or Backstage View.
System administrator: Configure Microsoft Office Group Policy settings to block macros from untrusted publishers, so that users can't enable them without deliberate IT intervention.
Security officer: Review the list of approved trusted publishers regularly and ensure it's up to date, verifying that only necessary and known publishers are trusted.
IT support: Educate staff on the dangers of enabling macros from unknown sources, emphasising that they should report any suspicious documents rather than enabling their content.
Keep it running
Use Office GPO/Intune to block enabling macros from untrusted publishers via Message Bar/Backstage View, and regularly test Office prompt behaviour after updates.
Evidence and audit
- Check 1 of 2What an auditor asks for
Ask for
How do you prevent users from enabling macros from untrusted publishers?
Look at
Check the Group Policy settings on several computers to ensure the macro settings are properly configured as per organisational policy.
Good evidence
The Group Policy should show that untrusted macros cannot be enabled, and a report should indicate when the policy was last validated.
- Check 2 of 2What an auditor asks for
Ask for
What process is in place to maintain and review the list of trusted publishers?
Look at
Review documentation that shows the regular checks and updates on the trusted publisher list.
Good evidence
The organisation should present a recent review log, indicating the date and outcomes of their trusted publisher list assessment.
Mappings
Closest match in ASD Information Security Manual: ISM-1675, Prevent enabling untrusted Microsoft Office macros, which asks for the same thing.
ASD Information Security Manual: 5 mappings
This control is equivalent to ISM-1675.
E8-RM-ML3.4 requires that Microsoft Office macros digitally signed by an untrusted publisher cannot be enabled via the Message Bar or Backstage View. ISM-1675 states the same end-state control behaviour in the same Microsoft Office user interface paths. Both are effectively the same requirement and implementing one would largely satisfy the other.
This control partially meets ISM-1674.
E8-RM-ML3.4 focuses on preventing users from enabling untrusted-publisher signed macros via the Message Bar or Backstage View. ISM-1674 is broader, requiring that only macros from a sandboxed environment, Trusted Location, or trusted publisher are allowed to execute (covering more execution paths than just UI enablement). E8-RM-ML3.4 is one specific enforcement aspect that contributes to meeting the broader execution-allowlist posture in ISM-1674.
This control partially overlaps ISM-1891.
E8-RM-ML3.4 requires blocking the enabling of macros when the macro is signed by an untrusted publisher via the Message Bar or Backstage View. ISM-1891 similarly blocks enabling via those interfaces, but targets a different signing condition (signatures other than V3), not trust status of the publisher. They overlap on the enforcement mechanism (prevent user enablement through Office UI) but differ in the specific macro-signature acceptance criteria.
This control depends on ISM-1489.
E8-RM-ML3.4 requires Office to prevent untrusted publisher macros being enabled through the Message Bar or Backstage View. ISM-1489 supports this by ensuring users cannot change macro security settings, reducing the likelihood they can weaken or circumvent the configuration needed to enforce E8-RM-ML3.4. ISM-1489 is about protecting configuration integrity rather than defining the specific untrusted-publisher enablement block.
This control depends on ISM-1676.
E8-RM-ML3.4 requires that macros signed by an untrusted publisher cannot be enabled via the Message Bar or Backstage View. ISM-1676 supports this by requiring validation of the trusted publishers list, which underpins what Office treats as 'trusted' versus 'untrusted' when enforcing E8-RM-ML3. ISM-1676 is governance/maintenance of trust anchors, while E8-RM-ML3.4 is the runtime enforcement outcome in the Office UI.
ASD Essentials for enterprise IT: 2 mappings
- IT.PRO-04.1Define approved hardening baselines disabling unneeded services, insecure settings and weak protocolsPartially overlaps
This control partially overlaps IT.PRO-04.1.
IT.PRO-04.1 requires approved configuration baselines that disable or remove unnecessary services, insecure settings and weak protocols; E8-RM-ML3.4 is one baseline setting: Office macros signed by an untrusted publisher cannot be enabled via the Message Bar or Backstage View.
- IT.PRO-07.1Restrict execution to supported, verified and authorised software with time-bound exceptionsPartially overlaps
This control partially overlaps IT.PRO-07.1.
IT.PRO-07.1 requires that only supported, verified and organisation-authorised software can execute; E8-RM-ML3.4 ensures Microsoft Office macros signed by an untrusted publisher cannot be enabled via the Message Bar or Backstage View, a narrower case of that rule.
Mappings show how controls relate across frameworks. They do not imply full equivalence or certification.




